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1CICERO'S COERESPOHDEHCE AS AH EVIDENCE OF HIS
POLITICAL SYMPATHIES
IHTRODUCTIOII
(a) General statement.
Cicero's politics have long been a matter of discussion.
From this discussion opinions widely divergent have resulted. Hot
only among his contemporaries are comment and criticism frequent,
but the historians and biographers of modern times have considered
his public career from every standpoint. The available sources
have been carefully examined and in his correspondence and speeches
material has been found to support the most diverse conclusions.
Those who find admirable qualities in his public life, have, as a
rule, been warm in praise of his principles. Those who detect
weakness and inconsistency have been correspondingly bitter in their
condemnation of his official acts. By each class, however , too great
consideration given to partial facts has led to a one-sided estimate.
Between the two classes of critics there are a number of authorities
who have expressed opinions covering every phase of criticism from
one extreme to the other.
If it be at all possible to secure a just and accurate
view, it is reasonable to suppose that Cicero's private and un-
studied correspondence furnishes the proper basis for such a view.
Distributed as it is over a period of twenty-five years, from 68

2to 43 B. C,, it records not only his settled convictions but each
temporary expression of opinion evoked by the changing aspect of
affairs. In order to trace and weigh his political thought and
activity, a detailed examination of the letters has been made.
This study has yielded certain results which appear below. To the
actual account of Cicero's political views and acts it has seemed
appropriate to prefix a brief discussion of the letters as histori
cal evidence, the comparative value of speeches and letters, as
indicating Cicero's point of view, and a brief summary of the esti
mates of Cicero's character and politics as found in the authori-
ties mentioned above. The citations given are from Uueller T s
(1896) Teubner Edition,
(b) The Letters as Historical Evidence.
The value of Cicero's correspondence as historical evi-
dence was emphasized by Ilepos, whose ?/ell -known comment upon the
subject appears in his life of Atticus (16.3). ^.uae qui legat non
multum desideret historiam contextam eorum temporum - omnia de
studiis principum, vitiis ducum, mutationibus rei publicae per-
scripta sunt. Perhaps no better summary of the historic facts in-
cluded in the letters could be found than this, but it must not be
supposed that the evidence is scientific or organized. The very
nature of the case made it impossible. Cicero was not giving an
historic estimate of himself or of his times as he wrote freely to
Atticus from day to day his impressions of current events, his per
plexities in the face of personal or national problems^and his
hopes for their ultimate solution. Moreover, in matters requiring
decision on his own part Cicero was apt to debate the question
Y/ith himself, showing forth its various aspects. Quia autem est,
he says, tanta quidem de re quin varie so cum ipse disputet? (A. 8

314. 2). This process, nov/ever, did not tend to bring into sharper
outlines the events of which he wrote, or give a clearer appre-
(1)
hension of the forces at work. To say, as Schanz does, that
the nighty transition in the government taking place at that time,
was reflected in Cicero's consciousness, is to give a fair expres-
sion of the history to he found in the letters. It is hardly
necessary to say, under these circumstances, that the reader's
mind should be open to impression in going over the correspondence
rather than prejudiced in favor of any particular view, or in op-
position to any particular theory.
v;hen it is granted that the letters were not intended as
scientific evidence, it must also be acknowledged that they v/ere
never written for public examination. This, while it applies pri-
marily to those addressed to Atticus is equally true of practical-
ly all the rest. Cicero's own statements on this point are both
numerous and conclusive. In 67 B. C. a letter to Atticus sent
from Eorae to Athens, which Cicero fears will not reach its destina
tion contains this statement: ITolebam illrra nostrum familiarem
sermonem in alienas manus devenire. (A. 1. 9, 1.). Again, in
referring to his consulship, he says: De me apud te loquor in ea
praesertim epistula, quam nolo aliis legi (A. 1. 16. 8). The lack
of a trustworthy messenger is a source of anxiety, so great is the
necessity for secrecy (A. 1. 13. 1, 4; 2. 19. 5). During that
crisis in Cicero's life when the threats of Clodius were becoming
alarming in spite of Pompey's assurances, we have recorded the
following: De re publica breviter ad te scribam; iam enim, chart
a
1 Schanz: Rom. Litt . vol. Till. 1,2. f 157

4ipsa ne nos prodat
,
pertimesco. Itaque posthac, si erunt raihi
plura ad te scribenda, okAA*inyof} tQUS* obscurabo. (A, 2. 20. 3),
The exact method employed to secure the necessary 'obscurity" has
been the subject of considerable speculation. To some, a cipher
(2)
is the obvious explanation. In this connection Louise Dodge
offers an interesting theory, namely,that the cipher consisted in
transposing the letters of the alphabet a certain number of times
forward or back, and that this device was used in Books 3 and 11
of the letters to Atticus. These books represent two periods when
j
such precautions were most needful, that of the exile, and the in-
terval between June 48 B. C. and Cicero's pardon by Caesar. The
absence of Greek words in Books 3 and 11 points to such a cipher,
since they would not suffer transposition in the same fashion.
The danger of interception appears to have been ever
present to the mind of the writer, but it did not prevent him from
expressing himself to Atticus with the utmost freedom, a freedom
that makes the historic evidence all the more reliable. Perfect
frankness, as well as perfect confidence in his friend characteriz-
es the account from beginning to end. If publication had been con-
sidered, the story might have been told, it is true, with greater
care and more logical arrangement, but hardly with a closer ad-
herence to the facts. The difference appears most striking where
Cicero mentions the same subject in a letter to Atticus and in one
for public reading or to another person. Although the statements
may be substantially the sane, one feels that Atticus had the
preferable version,
(o) Comparative Value of the Speeches and letters as Evidence.
So valuable in the estimation of the historian are
2 Am. Jour, of Phil., Vol. P.2. M Qm ). r>. 43^

Cicero's letters that after the year 63 B, C. they "become the main
guide for the history of the period. Of course they contain
erroneous statements , but in these cases Cicero was himself de-
ceived. For example, he "believed that Clodius was seeking the
tribuneship in 59 B. C. in order to rescind the acts of Caesar
through that office, while his real purpose was to ruin Cicero him-
self (A. 2.12. 1 & 2; 2.15.2). In that same year he apparently
never detected that the real head of the triumvirate was Caesar
and not Pompey (A. 4. 18. 2). The latter he calls dominus; Caesar
and Crassus are termed advocati (A. 2.19.3). .Another conspicuous
instance is his misapprehension of Antony's real intentions after
the Ides of Llarch, 44 B. C. Antony, he thinks, is too busy with
his feasts to be planning any harm (A. 14.3.2). This in April,
while there is every reason to believe that Antony's hostility be-
gan with the dictator's funeral, at least.
Making reasonable allowances for mistakes the value of
the letters as historical sources may best be measured by the
blank in our information which would exist if they had been lost or
never written. They are, in fact, the main authority for Roman
affairs from the conference at luca to the outbreak of the Civil
War, 55-49 B. C
. ,
particularly in the years 54 and 53 B. C. They
furnish the most trustworthy evidence as to the chronology of
events in that period; they contain important references to af-
fairs in Gaul and Britain; they show Cicero in his province and
make clear his relations with the provincials, July 51 - July 50
B. C; they portray the confusion in Rome 54 B. C. with the break-
down of the constitution, the conditions among the Pompeians upon
their withdrawal with Pompey to Capua, 49 B, G.
f Caesar's clemency

6and his virtual kingship.
From still another point of view the historic value of
the letters is made evident, that is, when the importance of let-
ter-writing in ancient times is considered. As a means of com-
municating the events of the day, their significance can hardly he
overestimated, for they hear the same relation to official records
that the press does in our own time.
Even greater than the value of the correspondence as
historic evidence*" is its biographical value. To say nothing of
the actual autobiography therein contained, with all its details
of public and private life, the personal point of view is of
foremost interest. It is this feature that makes the study of
Cicero's political sympathies from the letters, so obvious as to
be almost unavoidable. The man's own relation to the movements
and institutions of his day is constantly emphasized, often at
the expense of other information that might naturally have been in
eluded. For example, Pompey's exploits in the East during the
year's 66 to 60 B. C. are entirely passed over, while Cicero's
personal relations with Pompey during that time are made quite,
clear. Moreover, in any consideration in the letters, of Roman
politics, principal reference is found to the city itself, rather
than to any great national movements,- a perfectly logical result
of the writer's intense interest in his immediate surroundings, in
the considerations that affected him the most closely and the part
he himself played in the city's history and life.
notwithstanding the peculiar value of the letters in
this connection, the speeches of Cicero are often looked upon as
exhibiting his political opinions with equal certainty. It is

7tempting, indeed, to depend upon their definite statements v/ithout
regard to their partisan character. The orations, however, in
many cases cannot be held to contain reliable evidence upon the
matter of Cicero *s political views, from the very fact that in
(3)
them Cicero was speaking as a lawyer. Bennett states the case
thus: "Like most orators he is essentially an advocate, pledged to
a cogent presentation of one side of the case at issue. His aim
was to persuade - Hence we can seldom look to his utterances for a
temperate and judicial statement of facts; he gives us the side
which conviction or expediency suggests to him as the better and
defends this with all the resources of his rhetorical art.*'
Cicero himself acknowledged that this was the case in his speech
for Cluentius. (50.139), The opposing advocate had brought forward
Cicero's statements in another case in order to prove his point,
but these were disclaimed by the great orator at once, bed errat
vehementer si quis in orationi'bus nostris, quas in iudiciis habui-
mus, auctoritates nostras consignatas se habere arbitratur. Omnes
enim illae causarum ac temporum sunt non hominum ipsorum aut
patronorum. Nam si causae ipsae pro se loqui possent nemo adhibe-
ret oratorem. Ilunc adhibemur, ut ea dicamus, non quae nostra auc-
toritate const it uantur, sed quae ex re ipsa causaque ducantur.
In spite of the confessed ex parte character of the
orations, the bearing of those written previous to 63 B. C
.
,
on
Cicero's political tendencies has lately been a matter of dispute
(4) (5)
between the German scholars, Heinze and Bardt . The former
3 Selected orations of C^Qero, Introd. p. xiv.
4 Ciceros Politische Anfange
ft
Abhandlungen der phil. hist.
Klasse der Kgl. Sachs. Gesellschaft der v;issenschaf-
ten, vol. XXYII. Ho. 27 Leipzig 1909.
5 Review of above in Berliner Philologische Vv'ochenscrift 2 April,
1910.

8claims that the speeches in question represent a consistent ad-
hesion to the principles of the moderate optimates, while the
latter in his review attempts to show that they represent an
equally consistent support of the popular party.
If any other justification were necessary for the state-
ment that the letters are more valuable than the orations, as re-
vealing Cicero^ convictions, his utterances in "both upon the same
subject might be placed side by side. M. Pupius Piso, consul 61
E. C. is characterized in the speech for Plancius - homini nobilis
simo, innocent issimo, eloquent issimo (Pro Plane. 5.12), while
Atticus hears that - Consul autem ipse parvo animo et pravo tamen
cavillator genere illo moroso, quod etiam sine dicacitate ridetur,
facie magis quam facet iis ridiculus, nihil agens cum re publica,
seiunctus ab optimatibus, a quo nihil speres boni rei publieae,
quia non vult , nihil speres mali, quia non audet (A. 1.15.2).
During his defense of Sestius, he explains his failure to oppose
Clodius with arms, after the decree of banishment had been pub-
lished, by declaring that the security of his fellow-citizens was
his only motive for refraining from forcible resistance (Pro Ses-
tio 20.45). This was written after returning from exile, but two
letters to Terentia during the exile tell a different story. In
one Cicero acknowledges his fear as a reason for having left the
city without opposition (F. 14.2.1); in another the persuasion of
friends who were neither far-sighted nor sincere (F. 14. 1.2).
Another conspicuous instance of a discrepancy between letters and
speeches is found in Quintus Cicero's communication to his brother
regarding his (Cicero's) canvass for the consulship^ and in
Cicero's plea for the extension of Pompey's command in the East f

966 B. C. The familiar words of the latter are easily recalled.
Test or omnes deos - me hoc neque rogatu facere cuiusquam, neque
quo Cn. Pompei gratiam mihi per hanc causam conciliari putem,
neque quo mihi ex cuiusquam amplitudine aut praesidia periculis
aut adiumenta honoribus quaeram (De Imperio 24,70). Again: Quam
ob rem, quidquid in hac causa mihi susceptum est, <uirites, id ego
omne me rei publicae causa suscepisse confirmo (He Imperio £4.71).
Tho understanding between the brothers as to Marcus' relation to
Pompey is evidently somewhat different. Si quid locuti populari-
ter videamur, id nos eo consilio fecisse, ut nobis Cn. Pompeium
adiungeremus , ut eum, qui plurimum posset, aut amicum in nostra
petitione haberemus aut certe non adversarium (De Pet. Cons. 1.5).
Iam illud tute circumspicit o , quod ad Cn. Pompeii gloriam augen-
dam tanto studio te dedisti, num quos tibi putes ob earn causam
esse amicos. (De Pet. Cons. 4.14).
(d) Estimates of Cicero's Character and Politics found in I-Iodern
historians and Biographers.
Cicero's critics fall into three distinct classes;
those whose criticism is extremely unfavorable, those whose praise
is immoderate, and those whose estimate is a judicial mingling of
praise and blame. While it is not intended that the opinions of
ancient authorities be included in this review of Cicero's critics,
Dio Cassius must always stand out as the father of those holding
an unfavorable view, and his words as typical of their opinions.
O^e K<* i ~ro<, eKetvosv /v utt c\^jl y^o -re^ooV criro u -
6 (* $yjTou eirpaTTe (Dio Cass. 56.45). "Ee was
accustomed to fill a double role and espoused now the cause of one
party and again that of the other, to the end that he night be
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(6)
sought after "by both." The great historians^Llommsen and
Drumann, have ranged themselves on this side, as well as a number
of lesser authorities, among v/hom are E. P. Beesly, Be v^uincey
and Alfred Pretor. To the minds of this class of critics, Cicero
was weak, timid, unprincipled, vain, egotistical, self-seeking, a
short sighted politician who sold himself to successive interests.
However^ they fail to advance sufficient evidence to support such
a position. Citations appear infrequently and are particularly
scanty in Llommsen, whose arraignment is the most severe. Beesly
considers the speeches, In Toga Candida 64 B. C, Be Lege Agraria,
and Pro Rabirio, 65 B. C. sufficient proof that Cicero had sold
himself to the nobles, and was thereby earning his wages. Pretor
finds in the letters evidence that he had undertaken conflicting
obligations in trying to please both the optimate and popular
parties. But in the great majority of cases no references are
given to maintain the author's position. In considering the un-
(7)
friendly attitude of the great German critics, Boissier attrib-
utes it to their lack of experience in public affairs. He thinks
that isolation in academic pursuits has unfitted them for any sym-
pathetic outlook upon political life, so that they judge Cicero
as a politician, while themselves out of touch with public activi-
ties .
An estimate marked by immoderate praise is that of Llid-
dleton, liiebuhr, Stradian -Davidson, John lord and others. It is
their general conviction that Cicero was patriotic, honorable,
firm, not envious, that his power to see many sides of a question
was the cause of some inconsistency, that his love of glory arose
6 Trans. Herbert B. Foster. Pafraet's Book Company, Troy,
I. Y. 1905.
7 Boissier: Ciceron et ses Amis, p. 25 f.
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from a noble ambition, that his failings were those of genius.
They regard his support of the senate and optimates as the act
of a constitutionalist , and do not admit motives of self-interest
(8)
to be attributed to their hero* Boissier has an explanation of
this view corresponding to that given above. The English and
French critics in general approach Cicero's career with greater
sympathy, arising from a more intimate knowledge of political
life and its exigencies, than that possessed by the Germans.
To the names listed as admirers of Cicero, must be
added those of Abeken and Ke it land, who, while not extravagant
in their praise, are yet sympathet ic . They lean to the more
favorable view, however, and for that reason can hardly be in-
cluded with those who maintain a middle position.
This latter position is the common ground of the major-
ity of historians and biographers. It is held by How and Leigh,
Schuckburgh, Pelham, Forsyth, ^'arde Fowler, Trollope, Boissier,
and Tyrrell. The last is easily the most important of the group,
having a special claim to attention from his long and exhaustive
study of Cicero's life and writings. The moderate estimate giv-
en by several of the above seems to have been the result of a
reaction from the extreme criticism of Drumann and iiiommsen. To
summarize their conclusions: Cicero lacked resolution since he
saw good and bad in every party. He constantly aimed to do
right, but was often self-deceived. Circumstances were in most
cases beyond his control, so that he was apt to attempt the im-
possible. Finally, in spite of corruption in the state and his
own knowledge of its existence, he was unwilling to give up his
service for the commonwealth, with regard to special issues, it
8 Boissier: Ciceron et ses Amis, p. 25 f.
-
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seems more appropriate to discuss the views of this third group in
connection with the questions themselves, as they come up for con-
sideration in the letters.
One rather important question, however, is not there in-
cluded, the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators. Llany wri-
ters pass over this point without comment, but those who discuss
it have reached widely divergent conclusions. 2he death sentence
is approved by ITiebuhr and Ctrachan-Davidson. It is condemned by
Llommsen on the ground of tyranny, by Forsyth and Beesly on that of
(9)
illegality. Bennett thinks Cicero's interpretation of the law
(10)
both arbitrary and unjust. Abbott considers the sentence uncon-
stitutional, because appeal was made to the senate as a judicial
body, while it might have been justified by the senatus consult um
ultimum. The character of the evidence unon which the consnirat ors
(11) (12)
were condemned is treated by liax r.adin and H. G. Hutting in
recent articles, one claiming that it would carry little or no
weight in a modern court, the other showing it to be perfectly
regular. Doubtless no problem of Cicero's career has been discussed
at such length as this and by so many writers, apparently without
any prospect of establishing the truth. If Cicero had not had
Attieus with him in Home during the eventful year of his consulship,
letters upon the subject would probably have come down to us, but
his silence here adds another difficulty to a question that is
practically insoluble.
Turning now to an estimate of Cicero's character in the
9 Bennett: Selected Orations of Cicero. Introd. p. x.
10 F
.
F. Abbott: Constitutional argument in the Fourth Cat.
oration. Class. Jour. Ja' 1907.
11 Max Radin: Latin Leaflet vol. IV. Llay 16, 1904.
12 K. C
.
Hutting: Class. Jour. Lch. 1908.
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letters, particularly as affecting his public life, we find there
a frank and unguarded expression of the man's self, ^uintus Cicero
realized it when he wrote, Te totum in litteris vidi (F. 16.16.2).
It is not surprising, under the circumstances, that the writer's
faults should stand out prominently. His weakness is nowhere shown
ao clearly as in the letters written from exile (A. Book 5), al-
most all of which contain bitter railings against fortune and the
deepest despondency in the face of trial. Inconsistency appears
frequently, a fault which Cicero acknowledges in one of the letters
from Ihessalonica (A. 3.8.4). Perhaps the most striking instance
of inconsistency in the whole correspondence is afforded by the
conflicting statements about Appius Claudius Pulcher, Cicero's
predecessor as governor of Cilicia. In a letter to the ex-magis-
trate (F. 3.8) Cicero addresses his correspondent in the most flat-
tering terms. Illud quidem scio, meos multos et illustres et ex
superiore et ex alquo loco sermones habitos cum tua summa laude et
cum magna sollicitudine et significations nostrae familiaritatis
ad te vere potuisse deferri. At the same time, after seeing the
traces of Claudius' destructive rule in Cilicia, he described con-
ditions to Attieus, monstra quaedam non hominis, sed ferae nescio
cuius immanis (A. 5.16.2). Although it must be granted that such
weakness and inconsistency exist, yet these faults lie on the sur-
face of his character, often appearing as a result of impetuosity
and quick imagination. Look beneath the surface, and observe for
example, a personal loyalty to Pompey of nearly twenty years du-
ration, in order to place it by the side of individual incidents
in his career. It is a common thing to draw erroneous conclusions
from a correspondence, especially one that reveals so many chang-

14
(13)
ing moods in a man quick both to think and feel.
Vanity and selfishness comprise two other serious charges
against Cicero, "both of which must he admitted frankly. The former,
often innocent, is expressed many times, as in one off the letters
from exile, in which Cicero contrasts his state in Home with his
present misfortunes (A. 3.10.2). In a remarkable letter to the
historian Lucceius, 56 B. C., he asks for a favorable verdict on his
political career, betraying a vanity that is nothing fshort of as-
tounding. He recommends his own history as the most interesting of
material, pleading for a version even more flattering than truth
would admit (F. 5.12). Selfishness is most clear from indirect
evidence, particularly from the relative absence of reference to
the affairs of Atticus in the sixteen books addressed to him. That
Cicero could carry on a correspondence with one man for more than
twenty years and scarcely mention the events and interests that
affected his friend in all that time, to us seems almost incredible.
Luring the last years it is true, several letters are concerned
with Cicero's efforts to save the property of his friend at Buth-
rotum, which Caesar* s veterans were threatening. But with this ex-
ception, in three hundred and ninety -seven letters there are only
four
eighty- references to the affairs of Atticus. In twenty-seven let-
ters written from exile, there are only two. Lloreover, many of
these references include only a word or two, and a number of them
are brief messages to members of the family. Surely, no further
proof is required that the v/riter was unusually self-centered. Al-
though this was true in personal relations, there were crises in
national affairs that aroused him to unselfish devotion. His oppo-
-
nr
13 xeuffel: Geschichte der Romischen Litteratur, | 187

15
sit ion to Antony in the last two years of his life was an exhibi-
tion of courage in maintaining a position where he had nothing to
gain and everything to lose.
Self-interest was often a confessedly strong motive of
action. a.s praetor Cicero condemned the historian G. licinius
Macer, later declaring that he had received a greater return in the
approval of the people than he could have received from Maoer, had
he acquitted him (A. 1. 4. 2). Self-interest again played an im-
portant part in the support of Pompey (F. 1.8,2), and of Caesar
(F. 1, 9.18). It undoubtedly appears in Cicero's proposed defense
of Catiline for extortion in Africa 65 B. C. To Cicero's mind
Catiline's guilt was perfectly evident (A. 1.1,1), Yet if he de-
fended the guilty man and secured his acquittal, he counted on
Catiline's alliance in his canvass for the consulship (A. 1.2.1),
If self-interest had a prominent place among Cicero's
failings, he was no less guilty of self-praise. This is shown
particularly in references to his consulship, the glories of which
he never tired of extolling on every possible occasion. One may
be quoted as typical of all, his protest to Pompey (62 B. C), who
had failed to congratulate him upon his administration. Res eas
gessi quarum aliquam in tuis litteris et nostrae neces: itudinis et
rei publicae causa gratulat ionem exspectavi,- Sed scito ea, quae
nos pro salute patriae gessimus, orbis terrae iudicio ac testinonio
comprobari {F. 5.7.3). Cicero shares with many another writer of
the day this fondness for self-praise, characteristic as well of
all ancient heroes beginning with the chiefs about Troy. To modern
taste it is not acceptable, but to the readers or auditors of the
past it must have seemed a matter of course. Quintiliaa, however,
justifies Cicero's praise of his own acts, as not so much for glory
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as for defense. Reprehensus est in hac parte non mediocriter Cicero,
quamquam is quidera rerun a se gestarun maior quam eloquent iae fuit
in orationibus utique iactator. Et pleruECque illud quoque non sine
aliqua ratione fecit. Aut enim tuebatur eos, quibus erat adiutor-
ibus usus in opprimenda coniurat ione , aut respondebat invidiae.
Cui tamen non fuit par scrvatae patriae poenam passus exiliuin, ut
illorum, quae egerat in consulatu, frequens comnemoratio possit
videri non gloriae magis quam defensione data. (Quint. 11. 1; of.
12.1.15)
.
The charge of t imidity ^like all the preceding, has some
foundation in fact. Cicero's fear of Clodius when he hastily left
Eome after the decree of banishment, has been cited in another con-
nection. Actual cowardice is manifest in his letter to Atticus
written from exile, in which he is anxious that his oration against
Curio be suppressed, or proved not to be his work, in order that he
may not suffer from Curio's hostility (A. 3.12.2). To the minds of
the critics timidity was often associated with vacillation in public
affairs, perhaps the most serious of all the charges brought against
Cicero. Hor can it be denied. In the year of the first triumvirate,
59 B. C., his conduct was marked by neutrality, friendship for
Pompey preventing him from declaring against the coalition, and
principle preventing him from going over entirely to their side
(A. 2.19.2). The same thing is true of the years immediately pre-
ceding the outbreak of the Civil War, when a tangle of conflicting
motives kept him from a bold decision for either party.
Although Cicero's vacillation can hardly be excused, it
is simple of explanation upon a number of grounds. In the first
place he was a man of literary temperament thrust into public af-
fairs and neither a statesman nor a politician by choice (F. 1.8.3).

17
Upon several occasions he expresses his fondness for the literary-
life and ideals, notably when national problems seem overwhelming.
Such a crisis occurred in 59 B. C., causing him to write to his
friend, Qua re incurabamus, o noster Tite, ad ilia praeclara studia
et eo unde discedere non oportuit
,
aliqnando revertamur (A. 2.16.3).
In 55 B. C, as he looks forward to supporting the triumvirs, he
again deplores his forced participation in public life. Malo se-
dere - quam in istorum sella curuli tecuzaque apud te ambulare
quam cum eo (Pompey) quocum video esse ambulandum (A. 4.10.1).
Another explantion of his indecision is to be found in the fact
that he often faced an impossible situation and that his choice
was generally between two evils. This was the case in 59 B. CL.^
when he sums up the situation under the triumvirs in these words:
Heque enim resist i sine internecione posse arbitramur nec videmus
qui finis cedendi praeter exitium futurus sit (A. 2.20.3). Again,
in Ilovember 44 B. C, the future absolutism of Octavian is his only
alternative for the insufferable rule of Antony (A. 16.14.1). In
the face of difficulties like these, it is not surprising that he
was drawn now to one side, now to the other. Yet, through it all,
he made an honest effort to choose the right side as he saw it. A
comment of the "noble Brutus," is here unusually just - Omnia
fecisse Ciceronem optimo animo scio (B. 1.17.1).
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I. Cicero's Political Position 68 - 59 B. C.
Cicero's political career as indicated in the letters,
may for convenience "be divided into five periods. The first from
68 - 59 B. C. includes his early connection with the popular party,
the gradual crystallizing of his political creed, and the year of
his consulship, which repre cents the culmination of his theory and
practise. Between 59 and 56 B. C, the first triumvirate marks the
disappointment of his political hopes, and the exile his personal
downfall. On returning from exile, 56 B. C, Cicero attempts to
adapt himself to new conditions. Thereupon follows his friendship
with the triumvirs, and, after the "breach between Caesar and Pompey,
a long mental struggle lasting until the oi tbreak of the Civil V/ar
in 49 B. C. The period between January 49 and the battle of Phar-
salia is notable for his final decision in favor of Pompey. Lastly
from August 48 to his death in December 43 B. C., we have his re-
instatement by Caesar, his relations with the dictator up to the
time of his assassination, and lastly his vigorous opposition to
Antony resulting in his own proscription and murder.
That a very definite connection existed betv/een Cicero
and the populares during the early part of his public life can
hardly be doubted. But the extent to which this is true, is dis-
puted by the critics. Tyrrell traces his sentiments toward democ-
racy through the early speeches, but considers his attitude merely
(14)
that of an advocate. Still, a man born at Arpinum could not help
being imbued somewhat with the spirit of its great hero, Llarius.
Evidence upon this point, unfortunately, does not appear to any
extent in the letters, since they begin rather late and then for
14 Correspondence of Cicero - vol. 1. Introd.
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the first few years, are infrequent. One reference, however, is
significant, where Quintus is anxious that Cicero disclaim his pap-
ular adhesion, when seeking the consulship (De Pet. Cons. 1.5).
(15)
Whether the motive in so doing was personal ambition or disgust
(16)
with the violence of democratic leaders , or a "belief that popu-
(17)
lar control would he a menace to the constitution , or whether
these were all present to Cicero's mind, may he uncertain. But
there can be no doubt that he took a decided stand with the opti-
raates at the time of the consulship, and, in spite of many vicissi-
tudes, remained loyal to them until his death. As an optimate, he
formed a very definite political creed, the watch-words of which
wore senatus auctoritas and concordia ordinum (A. 1. 18,3).
His relations with the senate during the early period
were characterized by loyalty and faith. There is confident hope
when the trial of Clodius first comes up. Senatus *A/° e °S ~n~<^^os •
nihil constantius, nihil severius, nihil fortius (A. 1.14.5). Loy-
alty appears even when the party has disappointed him
.
A curia
autem nulla me res divellet (A. 1.20.3). At this time the senate
seems to have held their champion in considerable respect, since
they declined to allow him to leave the city in accordance with the
lot by which the consulars were chosen for duty in Gaul, on the plea
that his services at home were indispensable (A. 1.19.3). It is
only natural that greater devotion to the state should hr,ve proceed-
ed from confidence so justifiable (A. 1.20.3). Any line of demar-
cation between the senate and nobles as a class was practically non-
15 He it land: Roman Rer>ublic, vol. III. p. 81.
16(Boissier: CiceVon et ses Amis, p. 50 f.
(
7owler: Life of Gaesar, p. 73.
17 Heitland: Roman Republic, vol. III. p. 70.
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existent, so that Cicero's support of one or the other points to
the same principles. Accordingly, from the first he is anxious to
secure the good-will of the nobles, primarily to further his chan-
ces for the consulship (A. 1.1.2; 1.2.2). Later, after the death
of Catulus, their party leader, he himself takes the helm in ser-
vice of the class that had helped to raise him to a position of the
highest honor. Had it not been for the Clodian scandal, which now
came prominently "before the public, it is possible that Cicero
might have maintained the senatus auctoritas to which he had pledged
himself. But this whole trial proved to be a powerful instrument
in destroying his cherished plans. During the progress of the
trial the optimates were indifferent (A. 1.13.3); the voting was
conducted illegally (A. 1.14.5); the acquittal was unjust (A. 1.18.
3). Of course the nobles as a clan, viewed the matter from the
personal standpoint, and were disposed to rally around one of their
number who had been accused. But, we are surprised to find Cicero
lukewarm. His first indignation had soon become negative, although
he appreciated the real crisis (A. 1.15.5). Finally, awakening to
his responsibility, his invedtive was as tardy as it was ill-
judged (A. 1.16.9,10; 2.1,5). Ho sooner was the trial over than he
became apprehensive of Clodius* hostility, a fear in which he was
by no means disappointed (A. 1.18.2; 2.1.4).
The nobles not only failed to take a decided stand
against Clodius (A. 1.15.3), but showed such indifference to the
general crisis that Cicero condemns them bitterly for greater in-
terest in their fish ponds than in the welfare of their order
(A. 1.18.6; 20.3; 2.1.7).
As a result of indifference, selfishness and exclusive-
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xiess on the part of the senatorial class, his efforts to maintain
the senatus auctoritas proved futile. On this point the opinions .
of those critics who take a middle position and the evidence from
the letters are agreed. With regard to the other important tenet
of his creed, the concordia ordinum, the letters show very clearly
a consistent policy looking to the union of senate and knights,
hut there is little or no comment as to motives. In accordance
with the Lex Aurelia of 70 B. C. t the two classes shared equally
the duties of iudices. Consequently, a strong bond of union was
created in common interests, which might he further served by the
new policy, "he addition of a wealthy class, moreover, would tend
to strengthen the senatorial position and thus create a powerful
combination against the popular party and the violence of its
leaders. How necessary it had become to provide such a defence was
amply proved during the Cat ilinarian conspiracy, when for a brief
period actual harmony existed between senate and knights in the
face of a common peril. But the harmony was shor'- -lived. In 61
B. C. two sources of disagreement arose, the promulgation of a
decree in the senate to investigate cases of bribery among jurors,
and the refusal of the senate to annul the tax contracts in the
province of Asia, It appears that the farmers of revenue had been
deceived as to possible gains, according to their original con-
tract, and were anxious to make more favorable arrangements with
the home government. Upon both questions Cicero sided with the
knights, although convinced that their position was untenable
(A. 1.17.8,9). Seeing that a breach between the orders could not
be avoided without concessions from the senate, he upheld the class
to which he himself belonged, in order to preserve peace; but to no
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avail. Cato, leading the senate, exerted an influence more pwer-
ful than his own, and the concordia ordinum was destroyed (A. 1,18.
3; 19.6; 2.1.8).
The year 63 B. C, in which Cicero held the consulship,
was, as has been said, the most important of the period under con-
sideration. Llention has also been made of his early connection
with democracy - a connection which he was anxious to sever upon
being elected consul. Catiline, with whom his name was ever after
to be associated, v/as a competitor for that office (A. 1.1.1; 2.1).
To review their previous relations: Cicero had thought of defend-
ing him in 65 B. 0., in order to secure his alliance, as has been
shown already (A. 1.2.1). Although the actual defense cannot be
proved, his evident willingness to undertake the case was discred-
itable, as it points to a fear of Crassus and Caesar, Catiline's
friends, and a desire for political support regardless of its
character. Cicero was under no misapprehension as to the kind of
man with whom he was dealing. A long account of his career with
a full catalogue of his crimes appears in ^uintus' letter (Be Pet.
Cons. 64 B. C.). Doubtless from previous knowledge he was prepared
for the conspiracy when it was finally formed. As the correspon-
dence was suspended during this year, accounts of the many activi-
ties which occupied his attention are lacking, but references are
abundant in later years. He never tired of boasting of his achic* >.
ments and publishing the glories of his administration. For exam-
ple, in February 61 B. C. a meeting of the senate is described in
which Cicero indulged in his favorite themes. As he tells Atticus^
Etenim haec erat uno 9 ev/
<; »
de gravitate ordinis, de equestri con-
cordia, de consensione Italiae, de intermortuis reliquiis conui-
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rationis, de vilitate, de otio. Hosti iam in hac materia sonitus
nostros (A. 1.14.4} • Other references to the consulship, previous
to 59 B. C. are not wanting (F. 5.7.3; 2.1,8; A. 1.19.6).
Antonius, Cicero's colleague in office, appears several
times in the letters, but the transactions between the two seem to
have been principally financial (A. 1.12.1), The exact character
of these, however, is unknown. As in the case of Catiline, Anton-
ius' questionable career was known to Cicero ( Be Pet. Cons. 1.8).
In 62 B. C. he defended him in the senate, probably on some minor
charge (F. 5.6.3}
.
An administration as vigorous as that of Cicero could
not be other than provocative of hostility, especially on so impor-
tant a decision as the death sentence upon the Catilinarian con-
spirators. This was, in fact, the first point of attack. For this
reason Metellus Uepos refused to allow the retiring consul to make
the customary speech on laying down his office (F. 5.2.7). Plu-
tarch supposes that Hetellus was here acting in concert with Caesar
to overthrow the great enemy of the democratic party (Life of
Cic. 23). At any rate Cicero soon became involved in very serious
difficulties, arising not only from the Clodian affair, but from
an opposition on the part of the nobles, more intangible but fully
as determined.
Turning from the events of 63 B. C. it is interesting
to trace Cicero's early relations to the three men who in 59 3. C.
were to form the first triumvirate, Pompey, Crassus and Caesar.
The oration for the Manilian Law in 66 B. C. marks the beginning of
a political connection which lasted until Pompey 's death, inter-
rupted, it is true, by distrust, obscured by failure, but never en-
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tirely severed. Trollope goes so far as to say that Cicero's polit-
ical life from this point was governed by that of Pompey. In 65
B. C. Atticus is asked to secure the support of Pompey' s friends
for Cicero's candidacy. Illam manum tu mihi cura ut praestes,
quoniam propius abes, Pompei, nostri arnici (A. 1.1.2). In the
following year, Cicero's popular allegiance seems to ^uintus a bid
for Pompey's support (De .Pet .Cons . 1.5), and the friendship exist-
ing between the two is mentioned (ibid. 4.14). It is reasonable to
conclude, therefore, that Cicero needed Pompey first of all to sup-
port his candidacy, but the personal need was soon merged in the
party's need of Pompey to support the senatorial position. The op-
timates were threatened by unrest, conspiracy and popular violence.
At the same time a strong leader was in the East, at the height of
his military career, and as yet unattached to either party. It
was Cicero's hope to secure his influence for the optiinate side
(F. 5.7.2). But Pompey held off, expecting to become head of the
state without any effort on his own part, and missing the opportun-
ity to establish his own power: Time soon showed his unfitness,
which Cicero keenly realized (A. 1.15.4; 14.1; 18.6; 20.2). An-
other difficulty in securing Pompey's allegiance to the senate was
their refusal to ratify his acts in the East, thereby alienating
him at the time of their emergency (F. 1.8.4).
Even if the possibility of union between Pompey and the
senate was slight, Cicero still foresaw a tremendous advantage, both
to the state and to himself, in their personal harmony. The support
of the orders was weakening. He needed new resources. Who could
be a firmer defense than Pompey? Sed tamen, quoniam ista sunt tarn
infirma, munitur quaedam nobis ad retinendas opes nostras tuta, ut
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spero, via (A. 1.17,10). Putavi mihi maiores quasdara opes et firmi-
ora praesidia esse quaerenda (A. 1.19.6). And the republic, too,
would be the gainer, siuod non tarn interfuit mea - quam rei publi-
cae, quod erant quidam improbi, qui content ionem fore aliquara mihi
cum Pompeio ex rerum illarum dissensione arbitrarentur (A. 1.19.7).
Hot only would the state and Cicero benefit by their friendship,
but he needed Cicero also (A. 1.20.2; 2.1.6). Accordingly he gave
his support to the Lex Flavia, Pompey's Agrarian measure of 60 B.
C. The intimacy became marked (F. 5.2.6; A. 1,12.3), so much so
that Pompey received the nickname of "Guaeus Cicero." Looking back
over the early period of their friendship, Cicero wrote to Lentulus
in 54 B, C. Cuius ego dignitatis ab adolescentia fautor, in prae-
tura autem et in consulatu adiutor etiam exstitissem (F. 1.9.11).
Cicero's connection with Crassus was never very close. A
speech in favor of Cicero delivered in the senate during the Clodian
excitement, secured the ex-consul's loyalty (A. 1.14.3,4), suscep-
tible as he was to praise of his consulship. As the trial pro-
gressed, however, Cicero was convinced that Crassus was active in
bribing the jurors (A. 1.16.5) • Again,' he mentions his desire for
popular favor (A. 1.18.6). Neither consideration was likely to
recommend him to Cicero's regard, although his firm support of the
knights in their preposterous demands might have done so (A. 1.17.
9).
Early mention of Caesar is infrequent. 2he first is in
connection with the rites of the Bona Dea, celebrated in his house.
But so far as political matters are concerned, he does not figure
in the letters until his return from Spain, when he is heralded
thus: Quid? si etiam Caesarem. cuius nunc venti valde sunt secun-
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di, reddo meliorem, num tanturn obsum rei publicae? (A. 2.1.6).
Little did Cicero realize how favorable those winds were which
should bring Gaesar to the haven of his ambition, and how futile his
hope of shaping Caesar's course in any other direction.
Caesar's first object seems to have been to reconcile
Poinpey and Crassus. This accomplished (A. 2.3.3), he won Pompey
over to his side by promising the ratification of his acts in the
East, although Cicero states clearly that he v/araed his friend
against the union (F. 6.6.4). Overtures were then made to Cicero
himself, who might have been a member of the ooaltion (De Prov.
Cons. 17.41). But acceptance of Caesar's offer meant, first of all,
to support Caesar's agrarian lav/. If he did not support the law he
might remain neutral, or oppose it. Support meant personal safety.
(A. 2.3.3). Opposition, the loss of Caesar's aid. Loyalty to
principle triumphed, and he came out boldly on the optir.ate side,
renouncing, as he himself phrases it, reditus in gratiam cum inimi-
cis, pax cum multitudine, senectutis otium
. (A. 2.3.4).
In summarizing the tendencies of this first part of Cice-
ro's career, due credit must be given for his effort to unite con-
flicting elements in the state. The ideal party of senate and
knights, with Pompey as its champion, was well-conceived, although,
it proved impracticable. Here, as later in his life, Cicero en-
deavored to emphasize grounds of peace and harmony, rather than
throw his influence on one side of a question, when that meant hope-
less rupture. The very earnestness with which he devoted himself
to reconciliation proved that he was well aware how diverse the
various national interests were becoming. II o one realized more
keenly than himself the necessity for compromise, or deplored more
sincerely the attitude of the senate in their acquittal of Clodius
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and in the alienation of the knights (A. 1.18.3). It is only nat-
ural, under the circumstances, that he should have incurred the
charge of trying to please all parties and of negotiating with all.
It was inevitable when canvassing for the consulship (A. 1.14), and
is abundantly proved when seeking Pompey's alliance (A. 1.19.8).
The maintenance of the constitution and the survival of the common-
wealth, to his mind, depended upon the loyal cooperation of the
"best elements in the state, as represented by the senatorial and
equestrian orders. Peaceful and diplomatic means of saving the
state were always better than violent ones, and nothing exemplified
the point better than the case of the knights (A. 2.1.7). There
might be tiroes when even a sacrifice of principle was justifiable
(^.. £.1.8). Cato, here as always, perfectly consistent, did more
harm than good by his rigidity (A. 1.18.7). Thus the situation
appeared to Cicero's point of view, and in one important feature at
least, time showed the wisdom of his attitude. The concessions re-
fused by the senate to the tax farmers, Caesar gladly made, and in
this way, gained for his own party a powerful and wealthy class.
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II. Cicero' s Political Position 59 - 56 B. G.
The years from 59 to 56 B. C. include the rule of the
first triumvirate and Cicero's exile, both of great political im-
portance. Early in January 59 he left Home, remaining until June
at his estates, where we find him despondent at the condition of
the commonwealth and bitter toward the triumvirs. Weary and heart-
sick, he seems to have had little realization of Clodius' actual
intentions in seeking the tribune ship. It was not until his return
to Home, in the middle of the year, that he awoke to the situation,
when v/e find hirn turning to Pompey for support and receiving from
the public tardy expressions of favor.
The attempts made by Caesar in the preceding year, to
bring Cicero over to the coalition were renewed as soon as the
triumvirs assumed control. An opportunity presented itself almost
immediately in an embassy to Egypt, where Ptolemy -.uletes was in-
volved in difficulties with his subjects (A. 2.5.1). This was
offered to Cicero, possibly with a double motive. It was a posi-
tion of honor that might well conciliate a rival, and it would take
that rival away from Home at a most opportune time. Caesar himself
expected t o be absent in Gaul and doubtless regretted leaving Cicero
in the city free to ii fluence Pompey and Crassus. A visit to Egypt
seems to have appealed strongly to Cicero, but he felt that in loy-
alty to principle he could not accept favor s from such a source.
(18)
An me aliquo praemio de sententia esse deductum? (A. 2.5.1).
18 Tyrrell: Correspondence of Cicero, notes to A. 2.5, interprets
sententia as follows: "my design of opposing the
coalition and carrying out the old policy of the
opt imates."
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Caesar's next overture came in the form of a libera legatio (A. 2.
18.3), an unofficial embassy, the holder of which was entitled to
visit one or more provinces on private affairs, enjoying the privi-
leges of an ambassador without performing his duties. The freedom
consisted in being able to return to Home and leave again without
resigning the office. This favor was likewise declined, because it
did not afford sufficient protection against Clodius t while it
took Cicero away from his brother, upon when he was just then rely-
ing for aid (A. 2.18.3). Caesar's final offer was that of a lieu-
tenancy in Gaul (A. 2,18.3; 19.5). Over this Caesar hesitated but
finally refused, preferring to oppose Clodius rather than have se-
curity from him upon such terms. Like the first proposal, both of
the latter ones were aimed to remove Cicero from Rome. This should
be borne in mind, when Caesar's apparent indifference to the exile
is considered. That Cicero was moveo later to regret his refusal,
appears in a letter to Terentia, written in the despondency of the
exile (F. 14.3.1). It seems probable that Caesar became offended
at Cicero's consistent policy of refusal, although his attitude
toward the close of 59 B. C. is not clearly known, owing to a break
in the correspondence.
Cicero might well have hesitated to join the triumvirs,
when he saw the evident confusion and dissatisfaction of his friend
Pompey. Pompey's position was manifestly far from enviable. In
traveling from place to place, Cicero could not help observing the
man's unpopularity, which he mentions particularly in writing from
tformiae, ^uanto in odio noster amicus Kagnusl 2.13.2), and
again (A. 2.14.1). when he reached Rome, the same conditions pre-
vailed (A. 2.19.3; 21. 3 & 4), and were apparently a source of re-
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gret to himself (A. 2.21.4. cf. 2.19.2). At one time Cicero
thinks that Pompey pretends to approve Caesar's acts (A. 2.16.2).
At another he is convinced that the marriage between Julia and Pom-
pey points only to tyranny (A, 2.17.1), Perhaps Pompey is influ-
enced "by fear to uphold the coalition, rather than by any voluntary
loyalty (A. 2.19.2). whatever the true state of affairs, Cicero
was certain that Pompey was disappointed. Eis former place of honor
and popularity as victor over the pirates and conqueror in the East,
was lost forever. If he had expected to maintain preeminence as
Caesar's associate, that hope was destined not to be fulfilled. On
the contrary, he found himself tiring of his position, and regret-
ting the loss of influence that could not be restored (A 2.22.6;
23.2)
.
It has been noted that Cicero spent the first half of 59
B. C. on his estates, leaving P.ome in disgust with the proceedings
of the triumvirs, and with the state of public affairs. From An-
tium he writes, Statui enim nihil iam de re publica cogitare (A. 2.
4.4), and cupio istorum naufragia ex terra intueri (A. 2.7.4). To
become a mere observer of the country's ruin, which he thought in-
evitable, wa. hardly consistent with the determination announced
the previous year. But that exalted mood of patriotic devotion had
been followed by a reaction almost of indifference (A. 2.17.2).
One might have expected to find him active in opposition against
those in power, but as a matter of fact, he remained neutral. His
neutrality is explicable upon a number of grounds. Friendship for
Pompey, first of all, prevented him from tailing a stand, although
he thoroughly disapproved of the situation. Ego autem neque pugno
cum ilia causa propter illam amicitiam neque approbo, ne omnia im-
probem, quae antea gessi; utor via (A. 2.19.2). Moreover he
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thought that the triumvirs would work out their own destruction if
they net with no interference (A. 2.9.2). It is extremely likely
that fear of Clodius afforded another reason for temporary retire-
ment, in spite of the fact that such a motive is nowhere stated ex-
pressly. Still, after returning to Rome, he speaks of seeking the
people's favor in connection with Clodius 1 hostility (A. 2.22.5),
and mentions his inactivity in public affairs in connection with
Clodius 1 threats (A* 2.23.3).
It is difficult to say just what form of resistance Cicero
might have offered, if he had attempted opposition. His word to
Attieus upon this point is somewhat vague. Quodsi in earn me partem
incitarem, profecto iam aliquam reperirem resist endi viam (A. 2.
16.3 ). Abeken's theory is that a resort to arms was impossible,
failing which, he saw no other feasible means, and lost courage. He
was, indeed, practically helpless at this juncture. 7,'ithout re-
sources from senate or knights, his friend Porvncy, a triumvir,
threatened by the hatred of a strong personal enemy, he stood alone.
The sense of helplessness must have increased his bitter-
ness, as he deplored a state of affairs which he was powerless to
alter (a. 2.20,3; 21.1; 25.2). Scito nihil umquam fuisse tam in-
fame, tam turpe, tam peraeque omnibus generibus, ordinibus, aetati-
bus offensum quam hunc statiun, qui nunc est, raagis mehercule, qham
vellem, non modo quam putarem (A. 2.19.2). He was oppressed by a
great weariness of public life (A. 2.6.2; 7.4). He was apprehen-
sive of the future (A. 2.18.3; 19.1; 24.4). As for the triumvirs
themselves, they are designated by terms indicative of supreme
control. Cicero calls them reges superbos (A. 2.8.1), his dynastis
(A. 2.9,1), and tris homines immoderat os (A. 2.9.2). Still, there
were elements of encouragement even at the worst. Bibulus, Caesar's
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colleague in the consulship," took a decided stand, issuing edicts
against Caesar's acts and conducting an opposition against the
triumvirs that deserved success, even while failing of it (A. 2.19.
5; 20.4; 21.4). The youth of Rone also had "been roused against
their masters (A, 2.8.1), while Curio, a fair representative of the
class, was their declared opponent (A, 2,18.1 & 2). He is known,
however, not so much for his attitude during 59 B. C. as for his
activities in Caesar's behalf nine years later. It is interesting
to conjecture what might have happened, if Cicero had relied on
these elements in Home to uphold him in any determined policy.
Handicapped as he was, "by personal difficulties, success could
hardly have been assured, but his prestige might have been in-
creased by the attempt, while he could not have been crushed more
completely than by the exile which he suffered in spite of neutral-
ity.
We have now to trace the steps by which the designs of
Clodius against Cicero developed, leading up to the exile itself.
It. will be recalled that Cicero's evidence at the trial proved the
falseness of the alibi of Clodius, who, although he was acquitted,
never forgave the ex-consul for this testimony or for the invective
that accompanied it. The death sentence upon the conspirators was
a convenient pretext for attack, the tribuneship a powerful instru-
ment of revenge. Securing adoption into a plebeian family, he
stood for this office in 59 B. C., and was elected. As has been
noted already, Cicero, writing from his estates, seemed entirely
unaware of the real nature of Clodius' designs, supposing that he
intended as tribune to nullify the acts of Caesar (A. 2.12.1 &2;
15.2). Once in Home,' the truth was only too apparent (A. 2-18.3-
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19.1; 20.2; 21.6; 23.3). Hoster autem Publius mihi minitatur, inim-
icus est (A. 2.19.4). Cicero, however, was not entirely hopeless.
He trusted with the aid of the better class of Romans to make suc-
cessful resistance (Q. F. 1.2.5). A reaction in his favor, on the
part of the people, showed that such an expectation was not alto-
gether groundless. The memory of the consulship returned, bringing
with it some measure of the old popularity (A. 2.22.3).
Throughout the months of suspense, Cicero was disposod to
rely on Pompey to befriend him, but without much actual satisfac-
tion. In April he was inclined to distrust him (A. 2*9.1) . But
Pompey kept assuring him that there was no danger (A. 2.19.4; 20.2;
21.6; Q. F. 1.2.5). In October, Pompey had an interview with Clodi-
us, pleading with him upon Cicero's behalf, pointing out the treach-
ery of an attack when he, Pompey, had placed the weapon in his hands
(A. 2.22.2). Pompey, it will be recalled, had been present at the
adoption of Clodius into the plebeian ranks. In spite of Cicero's
reliance, the tide was evidently too strong for Pompey, and his dom-
ination by Caesar was complete (A. 10.4.3).
Clodius, having entered upon the tribuneship, lost no
time in securing Cicero's banishment. The decree published, Cicero
made no forcible resistance, but left Rome at once. Afterwards
he said, when writing to Lentulus in 54 B. C., that he preferred to
show the power of his friends in recalling him rather than in de-
fending him with arms (F. 1.9.13). With regard to Caesar's indif-
ference to Cicero's fate and his support of Clodius (De Domo 41),
it seems probable that Caesar saw in the exile his only means of
securing Cicero's absence from the city at a period so critical in
his own career. Both Keitland and Abeken support this view, Heit-
land adding that Cato as well as Cicero was too dangerous a leader
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to be left in Rome,
The exile lasted from April 58 to September 57 B. C, and
was spent chiefly at Thessalonica and Dyrrachium. It is without
doubt the most painful period of Cicero's career. The letters dur-
ing that time reflect a point of view so intensely personal as to
exclude all mention of men or events not affecting himself. Caesar's
exploits in Gaul, for example, are not referred to", although the
great general's deeds were then filling the public vision. An at-
mosphere of the deepest gloom pervades Cicero's spirit, while he
makes no effort whatever toward optimism or even tolerance of the
situation. Letter after letter is concerned with a rehearsal of
his anxieties, especially one written from Brundisium in April 58
B. C, which contains an unparalelled catalogue of misfortunes and
expressions of the deepest dejection (A. 3.7). Zven Atticus loses
patience at last and adds his reproaches (A. 3.15.1). At times
suicide seems to bo the only means of relief (A. 3.7.2; Q. F. 1.
4.4). His burning desire to return to Home appears more than once,
but nowhere expressed with greater feeling than in a letter ad-
dressed to his wife (F. 14.4.2).
Just as many important matters affecting the state are
passed over without comnent, so those actually appearing have some
direct personal significance, A prospect of rupture among the
triumvirs is referred to as possibly resulting in his restoration
(Q. F. 1.4.2). At the same time comes the realization that his un-
fortunate position is due to his refusal to uphold the coalition
(F. 14.1.1). Pompey figures only in a personal relation, and that
most discouraging to Cicero. In July 58 B. C. he failed to aid him
in the comitia (A. 3.13.1; 14. l). Eis disloyalty is lamented not
only to atticus but to Quintus (A. 3.15.4; Q. F. 1.4.4). In fact,
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almost ten years afterward, in 49 B f C, Cicero remenbered his de-
fection as an additional reason for turning from him to Caesar
(A. 9.5.2). His attitude on this point throws light on the ques-
tion of his original motive for seeking Pompey's friendship. Had
it been purely pat riot ic^Pompey' s disloyalty might have been re-
gretted as affecting the state. But so personal a view point seems
to indicate an original selfish motive in desiring his alliance.
In s^ite of discouragements from this quarter, Atticus was most
anxious that Cicero continue his efforts to win Pompey over, as well
as Hortensius, with whom he is associated as a powerful aid (A, 5.$
2). But Cicero was dubious about the attempt , ' having reached the
conclusion that his confidence in both was misplaced (Q. F. 1.4.1).
There was a slight possibility later that Pompey might use his in-
fluence to have Cicero recalled, but this was the most that he could
reasonably expect (A. 3.18.1; 23.1; F. 14.2.2).
Friends at Home finally came to the rescue and after re-
peated attempts, succeeded in securing Cicero's restoration, where-
upon he returned to Rome immediately, reaching Brundisium August,
57 B. C. As he looked back over the three years just passed, he
must have realized that they had seen the complete failure of his
political ideals. Had any lingering hope of rehabilitating his
party remained after the disappointments succeeding' the consulship,
even that was crushed by the entrance of the triumvirs upon the
scene. The senate no longer boasted its auctoritas, for that had
passed over to the coalition (A. 2.9.1). The optimateB no longer
looked to Cicero as leader, but were openly hostile (F. 14.1.1).
The concordia ordinum was nothing but a political dream. Lastly,
rompey, instead of becoming the champion of the optimates, was a
firm adherent of Caesar (A. lo.4.3).
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III. Cicero's Political Position 56 - 49 3. C.
The journey from Brundisium to Rome, as described to At
-
ticus, was a personal triumph for Cicero. He was welcomed to Italy
in a manner that seemed to indicate a return of popularity as
grateful as his misfortune had "been cruel (A. 4.1.4 & 5). It re-
minded him of the days when his position at Home had been alto-
gether enviable, llos adhuc, in nostro statu quod difficillime re-
cuperari posse arbitrati sumus, splendorem nostrum ilium forensem
et in senatu auctoritatem et apud viros bonos gratiam nagis, quam
optamus,' consecuti sumus (A. 4.1.3), He realized, however, that he
had left those experiences behind hin and must face the problems of
the future. Alterius vitae quoddam initium ordimur (A. 4.1.8).
It was inevitable, since the old hopes were gone and new conditions
met him on every hand. To lentulus, consul 57 B. C., a man who
had been active in promoting his recall, Cicero unburdened himself
in this perplexing situation. It is hard, he writes, to relin-
quish old principles. Sed te non praeterit, quam sit difficile
sensum in re publica praesertim rectum et confirmatum, deponere
(F. 1.8.2). It is equally difficult to decide between new alterna-
tives. Should he, at the expense of his own honor, defend Pompey,
which meant the coalition, or take the opposite stand in vain?
There was also another course which appealed strongly, the literary
life, but this was not seriously considered. Harrowing the possi-
bilities to two, he expresses them thus: nam aut adsentiendum est
nulla cum gEavitate paucis aut frustra dissentiendum (F. 1.8.3).
That he finally chose the former is well-known.
The critics have much to say regarding this particular
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(19)
crisis. 7/arde Fowler holds the opinion that Cicero attached
himself to Pompey V hoping to guide his political policy, and,
through him, to influence Gaesar; that he thought of reconstitut-
ing an optimate or republican party along nev/ lines. Strachan-
(20)
Davidson agrees with this estimate, believing it to be quite
clear that Cicero's main object was to regain Pompey for the con-
stitutional position, confident that the triumvirs were on the
(21)
verge of rupture. Cicero's conduct is approved bj*- Forsyth as
the part of wisdom, in that he hesitated to ally himself with the
triumvirs, because under them he foresaw the state's destruction;
or to break with them entirely, because he was powerless to offer
(22)
resistance, lliebuhr sees Cicero yielding at this time to harsh
(23)
necessity, while Trollope attributes his conduct to a desire
to save his party, by conciliating' Caesar rather than opposing him.
The considerations leading up to his support of the tri-
umvirs are quite fully expressed in the letters, and should be
noted at this point, in order to determine the extent to which the
critics are justified in their views. It must not be supposed that
Cicero approved of the high-handed policy adopted by Caesar, Pompey
and Crassus, particularly in securing for themselves extraordinary
provincial commands. He tells Atticus that, he does not regret his
absence from the senate when such proposals came up, since he
would have defended a measure of which he did not approve, or
failed to support a man to whom he was under obligation (A. 4.13.1).
Again, he refers to the promulgations in Caesar's interest as mon-
strous (Q.F. 2.4.5). But in spite of all this he did actively up-
19 Fowler: Life of Caesar, p. 170 ff.
20 -trachan-Davidson: Life of Cicero t>. 260
21 Forsyth: Life of Cicero, Vol. I. ^/340.
22 lliebuhr: Lectures on Eist
. of Home, V. III.
-o. 38.Zo
.rollope: Life of Cicero. Vol.2. P
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hold the triumvirs.
loyalty to Pompey was clearly his prime motive. For the
time being, he seems to have forgotten Pompey's defection, and as
early as 57 B. C. expresses approval of his friend's election to
the office giving control of the corn supply (A. 4.1.6 & 7), a
position of great influence. In the affair of Ptolemy Auletes,
while he could not use his influence to secure the embassy for
Pompey, yet he was most anxious not to offend him (F. 1.1 & 2; 5 b.
l) . The Romans, it will be recalled, had conducted negotiations
with "She Flute Player," in 59 B. C. How it became necessary to
send an ambassador to Egypt,to settle the kingdom, lentulus and
Pompey were rival claimants for the honor, while to both Cicero
was bound because of services to himself. For Pompey, the special
significance of the embassy was the military power that accompanied
it. As it happened, neither candidate was successful, a circum-
stance that saved Cicero from committ ing himself finally. Pompey T s
defense of Liilo became the next claim upon Cicero's loyalty, in
view of the fact that liilo had been his champion while tribune in
57 B. C. (Q. F. 2.3.2 & 3; F. 1.5 b.l). Another cause for grati-
tude to Pompey was the advice and help given in his behalf during
the hostility of Clodius (F. 1.9.11). In addition to motives of
friendship and gratitude, Cicero regards an alliance as proper on
the ground of utilitas as well as pietas (F. 1.8.2). Here, as at
an earlier time, he looked to the advantage that might accrue to
himself, and did not base his support entirely on personal obliga-
tion. Pompey's policy, moreover, received its share of approval
(F. 1.8.2; 9.10), although the approval was colored by friendship,
and although a most unsatisfactory interview with Pompey at Cicero's
Cumaean ectate, April 55 B. C, had given him the impression that
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Pompey was far from sincere in his professions as to public af-
fairs (A. 4.9.1)
.
Friendship, gratitude, personal advantage and approval of
Pompey' s acts, all drew him to the side of the coalition, hut
reasons equally cogent made him a partisan of Caesar too. He fre-
quently testifies to the friendship which existed between Qaesar
and himself, at this time, in letters to Quintus, very naturally,
as the brother was serving under Caesar in Gaul (Q. F. 2.11.1; 13.
1; 3.1.18). But Atticus also, is made aware of the new relation
in Hovember 54 B. C., when Cicero writes of Caesar's attitude to-
ward himself: Cum Caesare suavissimam coniunct ionem (haec enim me
una ex hoc naufragio tabula delectat); (A. 4.19.2). Various power-
ful agencies had brought him to the place where he was willing to
acknowledge that Caesar, a man whose advances he had frequently
repelled, was his only hope of safety in the general shipwreck.
That his rescue was to be brought about at the expense of principle,
he knew well. It amounted to a practical recantation for him to
join Caesar, but he did it, bidding farewell, as he writes Atticus,
to what he had formerly held admirable, iied valeant recta, vera
honesta consilia (A. 4.5.1).
Ill-will, neglect and actual hostility on the part of the
nobles, operated most strongly in driving Cicero over to Caesar's
side. I heir attitude after the exile had been unfriendly in the
extreme (F. 1.9.5). They had failed utterly to rally to his sup-
port (F. 1.9.14 & 15), giving him no choice but to adopt the
stronger side. Quoniam, qui nihil possunt, ii me nolunt amare,
demus operam, ut ab iis, qui possunt, diligamur (A. 4.5.2). The
agency of G,uintus had contributed to draw his brother into the
ranks of Caesar's friends, for Quintus had been treated by his

40
general with every nark of consideration and regard (F. 1.9.10 &
12). Just as this was hound to secure Cicero's loyalty, so the
military exploits commanded his respect (?. 1.9.12). It was
necessary, besides, for him to have a defense against Clodius and
other enemies, in case their activities should be renewed (F. 1.
9.21). Fortunately, the murder of Clodius in 52 B. G. put an end
to threats from that quarter. It might be interesting to notice,
in passing, that Cicero afterward considered his long strife with
Clodius to be identified with the cause of the republic, and
Clodius' hatred for him to be merely personal. This is the opin-
ion expressed in a letter to Antony 44 B. C. (A, 14.13 b. 4).
The relation vdth Caesar was by no means one-sided. On
his part, he met Cicero more than half way", showing the same desire
to gain his friendship, that he had already manifested so often,
nothing proves more conclusively that he looked upon Cicero as a
force to be reckoned with than the manner in which he repeatedly
sought his favor, or forbore to crush him entirely (F. 1.9.10; 7.
7.2; 7.5), Cicero refers in no uncertain terms to his good-will,
in writing to lentulus, calling it divina Caesaris in me fratremque
meum liberalitas (F. 1,9.18). For some time Caesar kept up a
correspondence with his friend (Q. F. 3.1.25; A.. 4.17.6;, making
his regard for Cicero perfectly evident (A. 4.17.6; F. 2.15.1;
3.1.9)
.
Once established as the friend both of Tompey and Caesar,
reconciliation with Crassus alone remained to be accomplished.
~ver since the conspiracy of Catiline a coolness had existed be-
tween the two, interrupted it is true, by a brief interval of good
fee ling during the early part of Clodius* trial. How, as Crassus
was on the point of departure for ~yria, friendly relations were
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resumed, without much sincerity on Cicero's part, it must be con-
fessed. He not only defended Crassus in the senate, but in an
elaborate letter of January 54 B. C, he makes every protestation
of friendship and loyalty (F. 5.8). IIo doubt the influence of
Pompey and Caesar was strongly exerted in both cases. At least the
letter is so exaggerated as to lack every semblance of real feel-
ing.
In following the development of Cicero's relations with
the individual members of the triumvirate, frequent reference has
been made to the famous letter to lentulus, written in December
54 B.C. (F. 1.9). This letter is the chief evidence for Cicero's
position at the time, a long and detailed explantion of his politi-
cal attitude, in which he attempts to justify his adhesion to the
triumvirs. He reaches the conclusion here, that the commonwealth
is wholly changed from what it had been upon his entry into public
life. In 63 B. C. aristocratic rule had been maintained; in 59
B. C. it was overthrown, and after a brief restoration in 58, was
completely abandoned (F. 1.9.17). It is unreasonable, under these
circumstances, to maintain allegiance to. what no longer exists.
Opinions must change with the times, and in practical application
of the theory, he espouses the cause of the triumvirate. Ita^ue i
tot a iam sapient ium civium, qualera me esse et numerari volo et
sententia et voluntas mutata esse debet (F. 1.9.18).
Once an active partisan of the coalition, his services as
an advocate were in immediate demand to defend such of their friends
as were prosecuted. Cicero, apparently, had no freedom in the mat-
ter whatever (Q. F. 3.5 & 6.4). Ueque enira fructum ullum laboris
exspecto et cogor non numquam homines non optime de me raeritos ro-
gatu eorum, qui bene meriti sunt, defendere (A. 7.1.4). Crassus
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Messius, G-abinius and Vatinius were all defended on these terms.
With regard to the last, Vatinius, much hostile comment has result-
ed from Cicero's acceptance of the case. Vatinius had figured as
one of the worst adventurers in Roman politics for some years.
V/hile tribune of the plebs in 59 B. C. he had sold his services to
Caesar, who was offended when Cicero exposed the character of his
tool, in the trial of Liilo and Sestius. His atrfcack upon Vatinius
during this trial, was one of the most hitter of all Cicero's ar-
raignments. In spite of this, Vatinius secured the praetorship, 55
;
B. C, by the most corrupt methods. Consequently, upon laying down
the office, he was at once accused of bribery in the election. This
v/as the man whom Cicero was called upon to defend, and whose de-
fense he attempts to justify to Lentulus. Tracing his connection
with Vatinius from the beginning he reiterates his hostility at
the trial of Sestius, as being perfectly unequivocal. Pompey,
however, had been the instrument of a reconciliation with Vatinius
during the latter' s praetorship. Caesar v/as responsible for his
taking the stand in defense of the accused, He acknowledges, how-
ever, another reason, namely, the determination to play off Vatini-
us against the nobility, in revenge for their support of Clodius
at his expense (F. 1.9.19). This may be an explanation of his
conduct, but it does not justify it. Taken by itself, it forms one
of the most serious charges against Cicero's political integrity,
and considered even as an incident in a long career, it weighs
heavily on the side of blame.
In considering Cicero's alliance with Caesar, Pompey and
Crassus, it is well to remember that he did not consider them a
formal triumvirate. Tyrrell has pointed out that he never uses the
word at all, and that his feelings about each of the three men were
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very different. Crassus aroused his contempt. Pompey repelled
him by his arrogance. Caesar fascinated him by his generosity.
(24)
Trollope expresses the situation thus: "Caesar and Pompey had
come together and Crassus had joined them." Ihis goes far to dis-
arm the critics who accuse him of deserting a well-defined optimate
party, to take sides with a formal coalition in control of the
government
.
In 51 B. C, Cicero's activities at Rome were interrupted
by his provincial administration, Cilicia falling to his lot.
Leaving the city in Kay, he did not return again until January 49
B. C. This period of Cicero's career is an interesting one, but
not within the scope of the present discussion. Brief mention
might be made, however, of the justice and clemency of his rule
and his military activity. A large part of the correspondence from
Cilicia is concerned, not so much with matters of provincial in-
terest, as with his distaste for provincial service and his in-
tense desire to return to Home. A letter to Hufus Caelius voices
this longing, and is significant as showing the relative importance
in Cicero's mind, of service at home and beyond the sea. Urbem,
urbem, mi Hufe, cole et in ista luce vive; omnis peregrinatio
,
quod
ego ab adole scent ia iudicavi, obscura et sordida est iis, quorum
industria Roraae potest inlustris esse (F. 2.12.2)
.
During his stay in Cilicia, events of the greatest impor-
tance to Rome had taken place, so that Cicero found, on his return,
an entirely new aspect of affairs. The confederacy that had been
preeminent since 59 B. C. was practically destroyed. The rupture
had not come about suddenly. Two causes had contributed largely to
the dissolution, even before Cicero's administration abroad, namely,
24 life of Cicero, vol. " ii~

44
the fall of Grassus at Carrhae in 53 B. C, and the death of Julia
in 54 3. C. With regard to the latter, the marriage of Pompey to
Caesar's daughter, had been a means of strengthening the political
union of the two men. So now, a succeeding marriage to Cornelia,
the daughter of Scipio Ketellus, had allied him to an optimate
house. A more fundamental source of disagreement, however, was the
growing influence of Caesar himself, whose ten years of triumph in
Gaul, had raised him to a position of great power. In these cir-
sumstances, Pompey was drawn to the optimates as offering his only
resource against a rival mightier than himself. His efforts to
limit Caesar's command in Gaul to March 1, 50 B. C. (P. 0.9.5; 8.
4 to 8), and again to November of the same year, were put forth as
much for the sake of his own place, as for the good of the state.
In addition to other attempts to strengthen his position, Pompey
had aimed at the dictatorship in 52 B. C. This is evident from a
number of references (F. 8.4.5; Q. F. 3.4.1; 7.2; 8.4 & 6; 9.3).
Rumors of the rupture had reached Cicero in his province, through
Caelius, who kept him informed of Roman affairs during his absence
(F. 8.8.9). One of the later letters from Caelius had indicated
that the breach between Caesar and Pompey might result in open war-
fare. Sic illi amores et invidiosa coniunctio non ad oGcuitam re-
cidit obtrectationem sed ad^oellum se erupit (F. 8.14.2).
If Cicero's position had been a difficult one, when he
returned from exile, the present situation was immensely more em-
barrassing. He sums it all up in a letter to Curio of August, 50
B. C. Res publica me valde sollicitat
. Faveo Curioni, Caesarem
honestum esse cupio, pro Pompeio emori possum; sed tamen ipsa re
publica nihil mihi est carius (F. 2,15.3). He felt obliged to up-
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hold Pompey, yet he knew Caesar was the stronger (A. 7.1.2). For-
merly his alliance with "both had seemed perfectly consistent since
they were themselves allied (A. 7.1.3), But as enemies, the pub-
lic would demand that he adhere to one or the other (A. 7.1.4),
Ho wonder he despairs of doing right, as he exclaims in a letter to
Atticus, Quam non est facilis virtus! quam vero difficnlis eius
diuturna simulatiol (A. 7.1.6).
At this crisis the deplorable condition of the state is
reflected in the correspondence. The old republic is now a thing of
the past (F. 1.8.4). Amisirnus, mi Pomponi, omnem non modo sucum
ac sanguinem, sed etiam colorem et speciem pristinam civitatis (A.
4.18.2). Corruption and irregularity in elections and trials, are
the rule and not the exception (A. 4.17.2; F. 7.11.1; 8.4.3; 6.3).
It is said that the year 51 B. C. was the only one of the period
when the elections were perfectly regular. Pre-election bribery
was so extensive, that the rates of interest rose F. 2.15.2;
A. 4.15.7). In addition to all these, Cicero saw clearly that the
life of the commonwealth was endangered by so selfish a strife for
power as that maintained by the great leaders (A. 7.3.4).
The period now closing had brought about a great change
in Cicero's life. He had returned from exile, broken and dispirited
forced to adapt himself to new Conditions, and to make the best of
an impossible situation. Ke wa:r" disappointed in the nobility as
a basis for a new constitutional party, and in Pompey as a support-
er of the cause. In the reaction he went over to the triumvirs,
who welcomed him gladly and employed his services to good purpose.
Then came the dissolution of the confederacy, with Cicero at the
parting of the ways. It remained to be seen, whether his alliance
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v/ith democracy was but temporary, or whether it indicated any fun-
damental change in the principles to which he had originally
pledged himself.
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IV. Cicero's Political Position 49, 48 B. C.
The year 49 B. C. opened with affairs at a crisis. Cae-
sar was at Ravenna with his army, having offered to resign his
magistracy and military power, provided Pompey did the same. Fail-
ing of this compromise, he threatened to proceed to Home. Up to
this point, his conduct had been marked by strict legality and by
that remarkable faculty for placing his opponents in the wrong,
which he displayed throughout his career. Pompey was at the capi-
tal, acknowledged by the senate as its champion, and invested with
military authority. The optimates had resorted to his power as
their only safeguard against Caesar's control, while he had accepted
the responsibility in the hope of establishing himself as head of
the state. Between the two parties, Cicero hesitated long, weighing
every consideration and struggling honestly to decide for the right.
Among all the causes of his vacillation, the desire for
|
peace appears most prominently, the same motive that had led him in
|
the early years, to make a fruitless effort to reconcile conflict-
ing interests. Again and again the letters tell of his hope that
Caesar and Pompey may be brought together and that something, he
cares not what, may prevent open warfare (F. 16.12.2; 4.2.3; 2.16.
3; A. 8.11d.7;lld.8; 12.4; 9. 11a. 2). In explaining his failure to
leave Italy with Pompey, he writes Afctieus: Pacem putavi fore.
Quae si esset, iratum mihi Caesarem esse, cum idem amicus esset
Pompeio, nolui. Senseram enim, quam idem essent. Hoc verens in
hanc tarditatem incidi (A. 10.8.5).
So much for a general motive. There were special dauses
of vacillation as well. He had, for instance, definite reasons for
not joining Caesar. Line was personal, a dissatisfaction with him

for his failure to assist in securing Cicero's triumph (A.
7.5.3).
Cicero, it will be recalled, had requested a triumph in honor
of
his military exploits in Cilicia, hut had heen refused. Still,
the
personal reason was the least, after all. A sense of duty and
honor forbade the alliance (A. 7.12.3; 22.2; 8.15.2; 10.8.5).
There is no doubt whatever in his mind, of the baseness of such an
act, as he enumerates to Atticus the motives that influence him
strongly to join Pompey, Turpitude coniungendi cum tyranno (A. 7.
20.2). So far as Caesar's party and their aims are concerned, his
estimate is low in the extreme, looking upon them as he does, in
the light of criminals and rascals (A. 7.3.5; 9.18.2; F . 16.11.3;
12.2). If they gain the ascendency a reign of terror will be in-
evitable (A. 7.7.7). In any case their cause is evil (A. 7.9.3).
As for their leader Caesar, no one is more dangerous. He
is a man of audacity (A. 7.13.1), a veritable madman (F. 14.14.1).
The tyranny of his rule is assured (A. 10.4.2), no matter whether
it resemble that of Phalaris or lisistratus (A. 7.20.2). In this
connection a letter of Caesar to Oppius and Balbus, dated March 1,
49 B. C. is interesting as containing an expression of his own pol-
icy - quoniam reliqui crudelitate odium effugere non potuerunt neque
victoriam diutius tenere praeter unum L. Sullam, quern imitaturus non
sum. Haec nova sit ratio vincendi, ut misericordia et liberalitate
nos muniamus (A. 9.7c.l). A reign of terror was, of course, far
from his intention, but to the Romans supreme power had become synon
ymous with proscription and cruelty. Cicero, moreover, considers
Caesar corrupt (A. 7.18.2; 13.1; 8.2.3). That the man possesses
great talents he acknowledges, but they are being exerted in an un-
worthy cause (A. 8.9.4; 9.18.2). Hum quam maiore in periculo civi-
tas fuit, numquam improbi cives habuerunt paratiorem ducem (F. 16.
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11.3). Such a man is his own worst enemy and must necessarily come
to destruction. At least, this is the conclusion to which Cicero
comes in May and expresses to Atticus. Corruat iste necesse est
aut per adversaries aut ipse per se, qui quidem sibi est adversari-
es unus acerrimus. Id spero vivis nobis fore (A. 10.8.8). Herein
Cicero prophesied more accurately than he knew, living to see the
dictator's downfall, as he desired. Lastly, Cicero not only feared
Caesar himself, but considered his demands unreasonable, when the
arrogant reply to the Roman embassy was received in January (A. 7.
9.4). To summarise, then, the reasons for not joining Caesar,
there are definite statements to prove that he felt a personal
grudge because of aid withheld; his sense of duty and honor stood in
the way; he estimated Caesar's party at the lowest; he considered
their leader a dangerous enemy and his demands unwarrantable.
On the other hand, the weaknesses of Pompey and his party,
made him hesitate to cast his fortunes with them. In the first
place, he realises that their preparations for war are totally in-
adequate (A. 7.15.3). As for the Pompeians, weal-mess and irreso-
lution characterize their acts (A. 7.20.1; 21.1; 8.3.4; 11.4)
.
Pompey himself displays glaring faults, frankly indicated in many
references. Although he is his friend, he cannot praise him, as he
writes to Atticus. Et mehercule quamvis amemus Gnaeum nostrum ut
et facimus et debemus, taraen hoc, quod talibus viris non subvenit,
laudare non possum (A. 8.9.3). In specifying particular faults,
timidity is emphasized (F. 16.11.3; A. 7.13.2), inadequacy to
the task set before him (A. 7.12.1) and indecision (A. 7.21.1).
Pompey 1 s flight from Rome and withdrawal to Capua with his party,
seems inexcusable, fugam ab urbe turpissimam, as Cicero terms it
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(A. 7.21.1; 11.3; 13.1; 8.1.3). The justice of this last criti-
cism is questioned by the critics, v/ho maintain that Cicero dis-
I
played ignorance of the situation from a military point of view.
This, however, does not alter the fact that he was influenced
strongly by Pompey's desertion, as it appeared to him. Doubtless
he takes other things into consideration when he blames Pompey for
lack of military ability, for his term <x a Tf> <x t -yj y -r^ 7- o s is a
sweeping one (A. 7.13.1; 8.16.1). Lastly he fears a reign of
terror on the part of the Pompeians too, should they be successful
in the struggle (A. 8.16.2; 9.6.7; 7.3; 10.3).
The above are in brief his criticisms of the respective
parties and their leaders. There is One ground of condemnation,
however, against both. They aim for supreme power at the expense
of the state (A. 8.11.2; 10.4.4). De sua potentia dimicant hom-
ines hoc tempore periculo civitatis (A. 7.3.4).
In addition to Cicero's desire for peace, and his objec-
tions to both the opposing factions, another element in his vacil-
lation was his connection with Caesar at this time. As in 60 13. C.
and again after the exile, so in 49 3. C., Caesar once more sought
Cicero's alliance. In April he requested him to come to Rome that
he might have him near for advice and consultation, Cicero being
absent on duty in Campania (A. 7.17.3; 9.6a; 9.16.3). To gain
Cicero's actual support was his object, but in case this "ere with-
held, he asked for neutrality at least (A. 9.8.2; 8.11.5).. If he
went to Rome, Cicero saw an opportunity to effect a reconciliation
between the rival leaders, and for that purpose, he declares his
willingness to accede to the request (A. 9. 11a. 1). But it was
too late for compromise. A personal interview wq,s Caesar's next
request, an interview that took place at Arpinum in April, briefly
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recorded in A. 9.18.1. Cicero's stand was firm. He refused to
go to Rome, since Caesar was un?/illing to have him defend Pompey
there. Their conversation was short and to the point, in part as
follows: 'multaque. inquam, 'de Gnaeo deplorabo*. Turn ille: 'Ego
vero ista dici nolo'i 'Ita putabam' inquam, ' sed ego eo nolo adesse,
quod aut sic mihi dicendum est multaque, quae nullo modo possem
silere si adessem, aut non veniendum (A. 9.18.1).* This inter-
view marked Cicero's final decision for what he thought right and
honorable. After the long weeks of vacillation and uncertainty,
he came out boldly in defense of principle and friendship.
Ever since the first of the year, while many forces had
been at work to cause dissatisfaction with the Pompeians, strong
motives were operating to draw him over to their side. Cicero still
felt a serious obligation to Pompey, mainly for his services, though
tardy, in securing the recall from exile. It seems quite evident
that Cicero overestimated his indebtedness both on this and other
occasions^but the fact remains that it influenced him constantly
(A. 8.1.4; 9.7.3; 19.8; F. 3.10.10). Atticus is reminded that he
had persuaded him to embrace the cause of Pompey, quia de me erat
optume meritus (A. 7.1.2). Moreover, the long-standing friend-
ship for Pompey remained unbroken, a friendship that had proved su-
perior to disillusion in so many respects (A. 8.2.3; 3.2; 9.10.2;
7.20.2), a loyalty that was greater,as Abeken suggests, than his
reason and discretion. Aside from the personal relation, he saw
in Pompey the leader of the optimates (A. 8.5.2), and with them
Cicero had resolved to take his place (A. 7.7.7; 9.4.2). There
was the conviction, mo-eover, that Pompey v/as about to restore the
republic (A. 8.14.2); Quando Pompeius rem publican recuperarit
(A. 8.3.2). Furthermore , the cause of the republic, so dear to
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Cicero, was identified with that of his friend. Ipsa rei publicae
causa me adducit (A, 8.5.2), To join the Pompeians was the only
consistent and possible course (A, 7.6.2; 26.3; 10.8.5). Mihi
<rt<o('ipos> unum erit , quod a Pompeio gubernabitur (a. 7.3.5).
In common with other prominent men, Cicero was assigned
various official duties in the civil disturbance. He was sent to
enlist soldiers in the district including Capua, Campania and the
coast, but he was not very active in performing the duty. Host of
the time was spent at his estates (A. 7.11,5; F. 16.11.3; 12.5).
Evidently he did not consider this function important as indicating
his real sympathies, but rather his remaining in Italy or leaving
the country with Pompey.
Over this question he deliberated for months. His proper
place was doubtless at Pompey 's side, iievertheless, he hesitated to
go while there was the slightest hope of peace, or while perplexed
by the conflicting motives already recorded. He changed his mind
! from day to day, until Atticus asked impatiently, Tot iensne igitur
sententiam mutas? (A. 8.14.2). Self-interest urged him to remain;
honor required him to go. Cautior certe est mansio, honestior
existimatur traiectio (A, 8.15.2), Matters were brought to a cri-
sis by Caesar's orders that Antony should allow no one to leave
Italy. At once Cicero resolves to flee (Aj 10.10), sailing for
Greece June 7, 49 B. C. (F. 14.7.2). As he looks back upon this
event five years later, he is uncertain as to the actual motive
which led him to make the decision. At least, he writes as much
to Matius. Seout ran illud tempus est, cum me ad Pompeium proficisci
sive pudor meus coegit sive officium sive fortuna (F. 11.27.4).
Throughout the period in which Pompey had virtually been
at the head of affairs in Rome, including the years of Caesar's
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absence, Cicero was moved several times to express his opinion of
the administration. As a whole, he considered it a failure, ac-
knowledging to Atticus, Erat enim ars difficilis recte rem publi-
cam regere (A. 7.25). To his mind, Pompey is not a statesman,
hut vLirok i t i /<( cu t<x t~ o v (a. 8.16.1). Of all the charges he
"brings against him, that of increasing Caesar's power is the most
serious (A. 7.3.4; 5.5). A letter to Atticus written in February
49 contains an enumeration of Pompey' s mistakes. Omit to ilia
Vetera, quod istum in rem publican ille aluit , auxit , armavit
.
Passing to particulars he mentions Pompey 's support of the various
measures by which Caesar's power has been increased and maintained
(A. 8.3.3). In this passage, Cicero seems to have recognized one
of the salient features of the situation, but does not realize
that Caesar had forced Pompey into playing the part of a political
tool.
For the sake of a clearer understanding of the year and
its significance to Cicero, it might be well to review briefly the
events of the first half of 49 B. C. In January Caesar marched
into Italy,' while Pompey was made commander of the republican for-
ces. During Caesar's progress to Home, Cicero was on duty in
Campania, Pompey had withdrawn to Capua. Pompey, who intended to
sail for Greece, was anxious to have Cicero join him, but for
various reasons mentioned above, he failed to do so. Caesar, in
the meanwhile, had gone over to Spain, leaving Rome in the hands
of his associates. In June Cicero left Italy to join Pompey in
Greece. Information as to his movements and plans ^during the last
half of the year, is lacking in the letters, as they are discon-
tinued from this point to February 48 B. C.
The six months which had just passed were among the most
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difficult of Cicero's life. Heturning from his province, he had
found Caesar and Pompey at variance. To "both, he was bound "by
obligations of the most serious nature. The strength and also the
weakness of each were perfectly evident to him. His first im-
pulse ua'd to prevent the approaching struggle, but when this proved
impossible, he made his decision for Pompey. In deciding for Pom-
pey, it must be granted that he achieved a great moral triumph,
and proved true to himself in the most crucial test of his career.
Ho act could be a more convincing proof of patriotism, for he knew
Pompey' s failures, yet joined him as representing the cause of the
(25)
republic against a determined enemy. Moreover, as a defender of
the constitution he could not sympathize with Caesar, who v/as mani-
(26)
festly endeavoring to destroy that constitution. This crisis
is discussed at great length by Tyrrell, who is enthusiastic in his
praise, presenting complete evidence from the letters to show
(27)
Cicero's integrity. We are now in a position to answer the ques-
tion raised at the close of the period ending January 49 B. G. was
Cicero's alliance with democracy after the exile, a temporary one,
or did it indicate any fundamental change in his original principles?
There is only one possible reply. At heart, Cicero had never been
anything but a republican. His support of democracy had been not
only temporary but forced and unsatisfactory to himself as well.
Tfie fact that the old republic was still his ideal, made it impos-
sible for him to uphold Caesar. The fact that the optimate cause
represented his political sympathies, made it inevitable tliat he
should turn to Pompey.
25 Forsyth: Life of Cicero, vol. II. p. 105.
26 Abeken: Life and Letters of Cicero, p. 509.
27 Tyrrell: Correspondence of Cicero. Appendix vol. 1.
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V. Cicero's Political Position 48 - 43 B. C.
In October 48 B. C. we find Cicero in Brundisium once
more, where he was obliged to stay until September of the follow-
ing year. He had joined Pompey in Greece, remaining in the camp
but taking no part in the military life. He was not present at the
battle of Pharsalia. After the battle, by which the contest be-
tween Caesar and Pompey was decided, Cicero returned to Italy at
some risk, since the consent of the conquerors was necessary before
he could proceed to Home or even remain at Brundisium in safety. A
mood of deep despondency took possession of him, like that of the
exile. The letters of Book 11 to Atticus are full of the spirit of
despair. His bfother Quintus, for whom he had constantly shown *
such affection, had betrayed him, trying to bring him into disfavor
with Caesar (A. 11.10,11,13,15,16; 11.8.2). This alone was a
great source of uneasiness, but even without Quint us' treachery,
his position in relation to Caesar was sufficiently embarrassing
and uncertain (A. 11.16.3). As for his attitude toward the Pom-
peians, he feared that his return to Italy had been a mistake, in-
volving, as it did, desertion of their cause (A. 11.11.1; 15.2).
How that the cause had failed, Cicero was most anxious to
secure Caesar's clemency, nor was his anxiety without hope of re-
lief. He heard of Caesar's good -will (A. 11.7.5), and was eager
to sue for his kindness (F. 15.15.3). Antony, at Home, was at
first disposed to put obstacles in the way of his reinstatement,
but after some disagreement, finally consented to his remaining in
Italy (A. 11.7.2). The matter was decided, however, by Caesar
himself, who arrived at Brundisium in September 47 B. C. f greeted
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Cioero with great cordiality and assured him of pardon.
In reviewing his relation with the Pompeians, Cicero
found occasion to regret their conduct and aims, although he does
not for one moment regret his adoption of the cause. Quare volun-
tatis me meae nunquam paenitebit, consilii paenitet (A. 11.6.2).
Later, in 46 B. C, in giving a "brief account to Llarius of his con-
nection with the party, he expresses the same dissatisfaction (F.
7.3,1, 2 & 3). There can he no doubt that he was keenly disappoint-
ed when he discovered how far they fell short of his ideal party,
that was to be the bulwark of the constitution. The unwelcome
truth was impressed upon him that their object was purely selfish,
their warfare cruel, and considering the common safety a victory
more to be feared than defeat. To the last, his feeling for Pom-
pey, their leader, was a mingling of criticism and esteem. v;hen
he heard of Pompey's murder near Alexandria, September 28, 48 B. C,
it is not surprising to find his letter to Atticus expressive of
both. De Pompeii exitu mihi dubium nunquam fuit . Tanta enim des-
peratio rerum oius omnium regum et populorum animos occuparat, ut
,
quocumque venisset, hoc putarem futurum. Kon possum eius casum non
dolere; hominem enim integrum et castum et gravem cognovi (A. 11,
6,5), This is his final judgment on Pompey, the man whose fortunes
for twenty years had been most intimately connected with his own.
Soon after Caesar's arrival in Italy, Cicero returned to
Home, where his complete reinstatement t oo£ place. He enjoyed
the favor, not only of Caesar, but that of Caesar's friends (F.
4.13.2; 6.12.2; 9.16. 2 & 3; 6.10.5), perhaps because he took care
not to offend those in power (F. 9.16.5), when his own position
was so uncertain. One of Caesar's practises, mentioned in a letter
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to Plancus at this time, is interesting as showing the power which
he actually exercised. According to Cicero, Caesar was accustomed
to pass decrees of the senate that had been written at his own
house without consulting the senate. To these, as custom required,
he prefixed names of senators hut without their knowledge. Cice-
ro's name had "been used in this way, and thereafter he had re-
ceived thanks from foreign potentates for favors which it was sup-
posed he had secured for them. While conditions like these pre-
vailed, Cicero determined to secure Caesar's permission to devote
hii.self to study 7.53.2). For more than a year, by virtue of
forbearance on Caesar's part, and discretion on Cicero's side, the
most friendly relations existed between the two. It might not be
too much to say that actual admiration for Caesar, as well as a
desire to strengthen his own position, lay at the foundation of his
strongly expressed approval, during this period. At any rate, he
writes that he was sincere in his speech for Harcellus, which he de-
livered before the senate in October 46 B. C, breaking the si-
lence of many months to declare his commendation of Caesar's acts
4.4.4). Disarmed by Caesar's clemency, and ignorant of Caesar's
intentions, he may have supposed that the constitution was not
imperilled after all, or cherished a vain hope that under Caesar,
the republic would revive again (F. 6.10.5).
As a result of his influence under Caesar, Cicero made
successful efforts in behalf of exiled Pompoians (P. 4.13; 4.8;
6.13). Through his agency pardon was extended to several of them,
although it was quite in line with Caesar's own policy, aside from
Cicero's exertions. In this way, he had favored Cicero himself,
and in addition, Cassius, Brutus and ^ulpicius (.?. 6.6.10).
CicerO was anxious that the prominent members of the party should
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follow his own example in yielding to necessity and surrendering
themselves to the man in power. This is his advice to Karcellus,
particularly. Primum tempori cedere, id est necessitati parere,
semper sapientis est habitunr (F. 4.9.2). In one case, Cicero
made an exception to the rule, that is, when he wrote the panegyric
on Gato. The death of that great optimate, the only thoroughly
consistent leader of his party, moved him to admiration and praise,
an act that called forth Caesar's disapproval almost immediately
in his "Ant i -Cat ones" (cf. Sust. Iul. 56). Cicero's attitude is
also expressed in a letter to Paetus, in which he compares the
death of Pompey with that of Cato, Baying, Pompeius - foede peri-
erunt . At Cato praeclare (F. 9.18.2).
The speech for Uarcellus of October 46 E. C, represents
the climax reached by Cicero's approval of Caesar. Thereafter his
sympathy declines, as he comprehends more fully Caesar's ambition
and gains a clearer insight into his real plans. The first note
(28)
of distrust appears in a letter to Atticus about this time,
during Caesar's absence in iSpain, when it was feared that he would
nominate magistrates from abroad. Actual dislike of Caesar is
soon manifested (A. 12.45.2; IS. 44.1) . A proposed letter of
counsel to Caesar, on matters of administration, not sent however,
is interesting here. It was doubtless of a flattering nature and
for that very reason unsatisfactory to the writer, whose real po-
sition was becoming clear, even to himself. Quam enim turpis est
adsentatio, cum vivere ipsum turpe sit nobis! (A. 15.28.2).
The time soon came when Caesar appeared to Cicero in his
true light, not as the founder of a new republic, but as an abso-
lute ruler (A. 13.37.2). He calls him rex both here, and again,
28 Tyrrell: Correspondence of Cicero, notes to A. 12.8.
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after the Ides of Liarch (A. 14.11.1; F, 11.27.8). A rumor that
Caesar is going over to the optinates is ignored (A. 13.40.1).
Mention is made of a dinner at which Caesar is Cicero's guest,
where the subject of politics is carefully avoided. Relations, if
not strained, were evidently very formal, and Cicero's comment on
the occasion is, Hospes tamen non is, quoi diceres: fAmabo te
eodem ad me, cum revertere* (A. 13.52.2). Distrust, dislike and
apprehension were all increased "by Caesar's appointment of Canin-
ius as consul for part of a day, an act that roused Cicero's in-
dignation (F. 7.30.1). During the first two months of 44 3. C.
his feeling against the man must have developed rapidly, for other-
wise, it is difficult to account for the exultation over Caesar's
murder. The letter to Basilus, one of the conspirators, written
on the very day of the assassination, is a hurried note of con-
gratulation, in full as follows: Tibi gratulor, mihi gaudeo ; te
amo, tua tueor; a te amari et
,
quid agas, quidque agatur, certior
fieri volo (F. 6.15)
.
The gradual growth of Cicefo's friendly admiration for
Caesar, has been traced throughout the first year after leaving
Brundisium for Home, then, throughout the second year, his slow
but certain realization of Caesar's designs, and his corresponding
hatred. He must have been aware that such a feeling was shared by
a definite body of nobles, and that plans were being made to over-
throw Caesar's power. There is conclusive evidence, however, that
he had no part in the conspiracy to kill Caesar, for he later de-
plores the fact that the conspirators had not taken him into their
confidence. Quam vellem ad illas pulcherrimas epulas me Idibus
Martiis invitassesl (F. 10.28.1). It is quite possible however,
that he was present at the assassination (A. 14.14.4). His approval
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of the deed is unmistakable (A. 14.6.1; 4.2). In Brutus and his
cause, he sees the only hope of tranquillity for the state (A. 14.
2.5), and in the conspirators, a band of heroes (A. 14.4.2). It
was most characteristic of the man that he should siese upon the
new combination of Caesar's enemies as a national safeguard.
Twice in his career, his enthusiasm had risen at the prospect of
a constitutional party, during his consulship, and before the Civil
V/ar. Twice he had been disappointed. Kow, for the third time, he
looked forward to a restoration of the old regime, and henceforth
(29)
devoted himself to that end. Events immediately following the
Idee of March, and resulting from the assassination, were most un-
satisfactory. The conspirators seemed to have no definite plans
(F. 11. l). They failed to take prompt action, when their deed was
once accomplished (A. 14.10.1), and neglected to assemble the
senate. This is a point upon which Cicero is most insistent.
Measures should have been taken immediately to provide for the
public emergency and to legalize the acts of the conspirators.
Only three days later, Cicero writes, - iam pridem perieramus
(A. 14.10.1). It will be noted that he identified himself at once
with the cause and shared the responsibility of the situation. An
informal meeting held in the Capitol after the murder seemed inad-
equate to the needs of the time and was not approver by him (A, 14.
14.2); neither was the public funeral of Caesar, which, in his es-
timation, should never have been permitted (A. 14.14.3j . In spite
of so radical an act as murder, in spite of the fact that Caesar
29 Abeken: Life and Letters of Cicero, p. 405.
"It is obvious that the cherished vision of Cicero's
mind had been the reversal of all the late dictator's obnoxious
decrees and the reestablishment of the republic in the same
condition precisely as during his own consulship and the period
immediately following."
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was no longer living, the course of affairs as inaugurated by him,
was uninterrupted. The man was dead, "but his policy and acts were
still in force (F. 12.1.1; A. 14.6.2; 14,2). Strange as it might
seem, the assassination had proved fruitless (A. 14.12.1; 18.4; 21.
3). Scarcely two months had passed before Cicero was forced to
acknowledge to Atticus that Caesar's murder, from which he had ex-
pected so much, had been ineffectual. Excisa enim est arbor, non
evulsa. ltaque quam fruticetur, vides (A. 15.4.2).
It is not surprising that Cicero was somewhat at a loss
as to his own position at this juncture (A. 14.13.2; 6.2; 11. l).
His connection with Caesar's friends had been so intimate that he
could hardly adopt the cause of the conspirators without feeling
great apprehension in case of civil war (A. 14.22.2). His hopes,
were placed in Brutus, Cassius and D. Brutus, upon whom the public
welfare seemed to depend (F. 12.1.1). This was in May. Meanwhile
negotiations took place between Brutus and Cassius who had left
Rome, and Antony who was in power at the capital, pretending to
cany on the government in accordance with Caesar's wishes. Their
first letter to Antony declared that they had always sought peace
and liberty (I. 11.2.2). Their second letter in August was a
warning to Antony but also an announcement of peaceful intentions
(F. 11.3). Finally, taking matters into their own hands, they pro-
claimed a full senate for September first.
Conditions in Rome, were indeed hard to endure (F. 10.1
1; 12.22.2). The state was utterly shattered (F. 5.13.3), and the
subservience which had been shown to Caesar, the victor, was now
extended to his friends in power, the common experience during
peace after civil war ( F. 12.18.2).
While the plans of Brutus and Cassius were taking shape,
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and Antony was flourishing in Rome, Cicero, who had obtained a
legation, was meditating departure into Greece. Proficiscor, ut
const it ueram, legatus in Graeciam: caedis inpendentis periculum
non nihil vitare videor, sed casurus in aliquam vituperationem,
quod rei publicae defuerim tarn gravi tempore (A. 14.13.4). It
meant, indeed, a desertion of the cause, but Antony was a dangerous
enemy. At length, fearing an ignoble death if he remained, he
determined to leave the country in the hope of a better fate, in
behalf of his party; ex hac nassa exire constitui non ad fugam, sed
ad spem mortis melioris (A. 15.20.2). He set sail from Vibo,
July 25, 44 3. C, but was destined never to see Greece again.
Hardly had he gone, when unfavorable winds prevented his voyage,
and he learned that his absence was regretted. Repenting of his
decision to flee, moved by patriotism (F. 10.1.1), he turned back
(A.- 16.7.1), further influenced by Atticus (A. 16.7.2) and by
Brutus (B. 1.10.4)
.
In August he was in Rome again, to take his place at
the head of the state, summoned to this duty by the better elements
of society, the acknowledged leader of senate and optimates. The
year which foll07/s vies with that of the consulship as the annus
mirabilis of his political career, just as the preceding year had
marked the climax of his literary activity. It is necessary at
this point to retrace his connection with Antony during the first
part of 44 B. C, since the mighty duel between the two began here
and terminated only with his death. At first he was deceived as
to Antony's intentions, thinking that he had given himself over so
completely to luxury, that no harm from him was to be feared.
Quern quidem ego epularum magis arbitror rationem habere quam quic-
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quam mail cogitare (A. 14.3.2). This was in April. In Hay he
was resolved to maintain friendly relations with him as long as
possible, although his hostility was becoming noticeable (A. I4.
13b. 1 80 5; F. 11.5.2; 16.23.2). Cicero knew, furthermore, that
his official acts showed a high-handed policy, quite unjustifiable.
Citizenship, for example, was granted to the Sicilians (A. 14.12.
l), in accordance, as he said, with Caesar's wishes, which he pre-
tended to follow in this as well as other measures (A. 14.13.6).
During the latter part of the year, Cicero was forced to recognize
Antony's enmity as a serious matter. His attitude became unen-
durable (F. 10.1.1), and not satisfied with threats, he v/ent so
far as to plot against his life (F. 12.2.1). A convenient
charge of complicity in Caesar's murder was next trumped up
(F. 12.2.1), while in general he displayed throughout these months
an untiring malignity (F. 12.3.1).
with a man of such characteristics at the head of affairs",
cruel, overbearing and tyrannical, it is no wonder that the state
suffered sorely. Cicero describes its condition in Liept ember 44
B. C, to Plancus thus: Quae potest enim spes esse in ea re publi-
ca, in qua horainis impot ent issimi at que int emperantissimi armis
oppressa sunt omnia, et in qua nec senatus nec populus vim liabet
ullam, nec leges ullae sunt, nec iudicia nec omnino simulacrum
aliquod ae vestigium civitatis? (F. 10.1.1). At such a crisis,
Cicero assumed the leadership in an opposition to Antony that was
marked by the most patriotic and unselfish devotion. Against the
military power wielded by his enemy he matched all the resources
of his oratorical art. Fourteen Philippics delivered between
September 1, 44 and April 23, 43 33. 0., contain the record of the

struggle, a contest contra anna verba (F. 12.22.1). The courage
of his long strife commands both respect and admiration, for he
lived in constant fear of Antony's power (A. 16.9). In addition
to the warfare he himself had declared, he urged D. Brutus and
Plancus against their common enemy (F. 11.12.2; 10. 19.2).
In the meantime :mtony had left Rome and was at Lutina
in command of his forces. Refusing to comply with the senate's
injunction to raise the siege of that town, he sent back counter
demands to Rome (F. 12.4.1). The battle of Ivlutina took place
April 21, a victory over Antony, but followed almost immediately
by the death of both consuls, Eirtius and Pansa. After this de-
feat, Antony set out to join lepidus, with whom he united his army
May 29, 43 B. C.
Cicero's activities had been by no means restricted to
speeches in the senate. There were conflicting elements among
the constitutionalists, which he sought to harmonize in order to
strengthen his party. Several letters, for instance, consist of
appeals to various prominent men for their support and loyalty.
L. Plancus, mentioned above, an administrator in Gaul, was one of
them (F. 10.1.2; 3; 5; 6)j also D. Brutus, governor of Cisalpine
Gaul (F. 11.5), and in addition to these, Cassius, Trebonius, and
Cornificius. His chief reliance however, was on Brutus and Cassius,
his virtual lieutenants, to whom he had looked the previous year
for protection in behalf of the state.
Brutus and Cassius were now the military defenders of the
republic. For Brutus, Cicero bad long cherished a sincere regard,
expressed in the letters as early as 50 B. C. (F. 2.13.2). Ad-
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miration for him is also evident (A, 14.15.2; 17a. 5), and there
is no doubt that he considered him their party leader (A. 14.20.3
3) , in which connection, his name is, of course, coupled with that
of Cassius (B. 2.1.3). Brutus, who had gone over to Greece for
the purpose of recruiting an army, was nov; at the head of a con-
siderable military force, which Cicero was anxious to have at his
disposal in Italy. In June he writes to Brutus, urging him to
return. Quam oh rem advola, obsecro, at que earn rem publicam, quam
virtute atque animi magnitudine magis quam eventis rerum libera-
visti, exitu libera. Omnis omnium concursus ad te futurus est
(B. 1.10.4). After the loss of the consuls and the union of hos-
tile armies in the north, the constitutionalists looked to Brutus
and Cassius as their chief dependence (F. 12.6.2; 8.1). Cicero,
almost despairing of the republic's life, believed that it could
survive only by their efforts: Aut nulla (res publica) erit aut
ab isto istisve servabitur (A. 14.20.3).
The weak points in their position were painfully cle-r
the need of money and a larger military force (F. 12.3.1; B. 2.
4) '," yet he was hopeful of the result, having roused the senate and
people (F. 10.28.2). Here, as on several other occasions, his
characteristic change of mood is reflected, as he siez3S eagerly
upon the slightest indication for the better, and magnifies it
out of all proportion to the reality. Still appearances were ac-
tually more favorable for a short time after the battles at
Forum Gallorum and Mutiaa (F. 12.28.3; A. 15.13.4; B. 1.3.1).
CiCero received honors after the latter (Phil. 14.5), and a letter
from Caseins Parmensis, written in June, shows the estimation in
which he vi&s held by his countrymen. Est enim tua toga omnium
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armis felicior; quae nunc quoque nobis poene victam rem publican
ex manibus hostium eripuit ac reddidit. (F. IS. 13.1). Ae head of
the state, Cicero was vested with the chief military authority, to
which the honors just mentioned bear witness. Brutus, moreover, re
ferred to him for orders (B. 2.3.2), and other generals, Galba,
Plancus, !> Brutus and lepidus, sent frequent reports of operations
to their superior in Rome. The first place in the senate, as well
as in the army, was also accorded to him, a position which he had
always coveted. Up to this point, his belief in the senate as a
governing body had never been shaken, in spite of more than one
practical demonstration of its inefficiency. Under the proper con-
ditions, he thought, the senate would be quite adequate to all the
exigencies of the times, failing to see that the fault lay quite as
much in its own organization and methods, as in attacks from forces
without. Gicero, d ring these months, realized that the senate
was hampered (F. 11.7.2), but thought it was responding nobly to
the demands made upon it (F. IE. 4.1; 10.28.3; 12.5.2). It was not
until June that the conviction of its powerlessness was brought
home to him, $
'
p> vo-v enim erat meum senatus; id iam est disso-
lutum (F. 11.14.1), and that, in spite of it s courage, other re-
sources were required. To Cassius he writes the truth that has
been forced upon him. Fort is sane senatus, sed maxime spe subsidii
tui (F. 12.10.1).
There remains only t o consider Cicero's relations with
the future emperor Oct avian, before bringing this last period to a
close. When he first appeared in Italy, a more youth, the adopted
son and heir of Caesar, Cicero thought him of little or no impor-
tance. In April 44 B. C, he expresses this opinion, shared by
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Romans in general at that time. Ham de Octavio susque deque (A.
14.6.1). He declined absolutely, to greet him as "Caesar" (A. 14.
12.2). It was not long, however, before he began to see possibil-
ities in Octavian (A. 15.12.2), especially after the young Caesar
was charged with an attempt against Antony's life. Magna spes est
in eo (F. 12.23.2). It must be acknowledged, however, that his
motives in seeking Antony's death, were probably personal, due to
frauds practised upon him in connection with his inheritance, and
not patriotic. He further commended himself to Cicero by recruit-
ing an army among his father's veterans, and seeking the great
leader's advice (A. 16.8). Furthermore, he requested the senate's
authority for his acts (A, 16.9). In all this the guiding force
of his own ambition is perfectly evident, as he laid the founda-
tions of future influence. His first attempt against Antony, the
acquisition of an army, the senate's support, all these tended to
increase his personal power, and at the same time, to disarm
Cicero, "here was a lurking fear, however, in Cicero's mind, that
this growing power might mean the confirmation of Caesar's acts
(A. 16.14.1), but his faith in Octavian as a new champion of the
republic finally triumphed (F. 11.8.2). The fift h Philippic
declares his confidence in enthusiastic terms. It a enim ad rem
publicam accessit ut earn confirmaret, non ut everteret (Phil. 5.
18. 49 & 50). His faith in Octavian never reached a higher point
than on this occasion. Within a few months, doubt and suspicion
returned (B. 1.3.1; 18. 3 & 4), contributing doubtless, to his
desire that Brutus set out for Italy to lead the republican forces,
since, in successive letters, he summons Brutus, and voices his
lack of confidence in Octavian. Hoc adulescentis praesidium equi-
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dem adhuc firmum esse confido, sed ita multi labefactant, ut , ne
moveatur, interdum ext imescam (B. 1. 10.5).
In drawing conclusions from the events of the last few
years of Cicero's life, it must be remembered that after Phar-
salia, as previously on returning from exile, he faced new condi-
tions. The death of Pompey,and the revelation of his party's pol-
icy, had completely destroyed every hope of defense for the state,
from that quarter. Nothing apparently, remained for him to do, but
to secure Caesar's pardon, avoid further offense, and devote
himself to literature. Even then, he thought he saw in Caesar and
his plans, possibilities for a free republic. Disappointed once
more, he became his enemy, and this time did not abandon the cause
for any reason, but remained loyal to senate and constitution
until his death. The reality of his devotion to patriotic ideals,
during these years, cannot be questioned. It contributed more than
a little to his approval of Caesar, as has been remarked. It ex-
plains his cooperation with Oct avian, to whom he resorted at the
last. But more than all, it accounts for the long disinterested
struggle with Antony. Here, as in every preceding period, he en-
deavored to remain true to his principles as a loyal republican,
,
sometimes with indifferent, but, more often, with conspicuous
success
.
At this point Cicero's correspondence closes. The events
immediately following are too well known to require more than a
passing reference; the union of Antony and Oct avian, the formation
of the Second Triumvirate in Lovember, the revival of proscriptions,
and the final battle at Philippi in the following autumn. Among
the prominent Romans proscribed, Cicero v/as included, as a con-

69
cession to Antony's hatred. The murder took place hear his For-
mian villa, December 7, 43 B. C, the inevitable result of his
loyalty to republicanism. The manner of his death was cruel, but
as Livy points out, it was no more so than he would have wished
for Antony (Fragm. apud iienec. Suasor. 6). A description of the
murder is given by Plutarch, (Gic. 47. 48) who concludes his ac-
count by saying, that when Antony heard of it, and knew that
Cicero^ head and hands had been brought to Rome , "he cried aloud
that the main object of the proscriptions had been attained. He
ordered Cicero's head and hands to be fixed above the rostra -
a sight at which the Romans shuddered, for they seemed to see
there, not the face of 3icero, but the image of Antony's soul."
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Conclusions
i
Cicero lacked political int uit i
o
n
.
It is apparent from a study of the letters, that Cicero
j
failed utterly to understand the times in which he lived, nothing
is more obvious in the many references made to the deplorable con-
cition of the state, than that he was unable to see the causes
that had given rise to such a condition. He felt that the old
forms were weakening and the old ideals losing their force, but the
new era was beyond his vision. The republic was indeed, a thing of
the past, but the empire never occurred to his mind as a thing of
the future. A sentence from a letter to Caelius^ written in 51
B. C., is significant, in which Cicero confesses his inability to
forecast the issue of events, lie que enim fuit
,
quod tu plus
providere posses quam quivis nostrum in primisque ego (F. 2.8.2).
Another reference (De Divinatione , 1.24) bears witness to the fact
that Cicero did not always comprehend the times, where Quintus
says, Aut num propterea nulla est rei publicae gerendae ratio at que
prudent ia, quia mult a Cn. Pompeium, quaedam M« Catonem, non nulla
etiam te ipsum fefellerunt?
As for the great influences that v/ere affecting the very
life of the republic and leading to a strongly centralized control,
they were hidden from him completely. 2he significance of the pro-
consular command, so dangerous an instrument in the hands of
Caesar and Pompey, was not understood. The administration of a
province from Rome, conducted by Pompey, when he ought to have gone
to Spain, gave no hint of the privileges later assumed by the em-
peror
.
The extension of the franchise was a question that never
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affected him, except as he disapproved of Antony's granting citi-
zenship to the Sicilians. The tribunician power, a source of con-
tention since the days of the Gracchi, and the foundation of im-
perial prerogative, appeared to him merely as a means to accomplish
a personal revenge. That he thought lightly of provincial duties,
has "been remarked already, in the case of his own administration,
but the whole relation of Rome to her provinces he did not see,
nor did he understand that the vitality of the nation was no longer
restricted to Italy, but that the center of gravity was shifting
to the extra-marine possessions. It seems incredible, moreover,
that he could have supposed a restoration of the republic along
the old lines was possible, when senate and assemblies had not for
many years performed their original representative function. Cne
fact, however, seems to have been clear, namely, that the preemi-
nence of any person or party in the state, depended chiefly upon
military resources. This was brought home to him when an army
was so much needed by the constitutionalists in order to oppose
Antony. It must be borne in mind, in explaining Cicero's narrow
outlook, that the limits of Rome practically bounded his point of
view. He was a true citizen of Rome, the city, as opposed to
Caesar or Octavian whose interests extended as widely as the em-
pire. So much for negative conclusions.
2. Cicero ' s great desire for peace led him t o action prompt ed by
polit ical expediency.
On the positive side there is, first in importance, a
life -long desire for peace. This was, to be sure, partly tempera-
mental, for his tastes were never warlike; but more than that, he
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deemed a policy of peace the "best for the state. He endeavored
constantly to remove causes of variance and emphasise common sym-
pathies. This is especially evident in his first scheme for the
public welfare, in which the concordia ordinum played so prominent
a part, and again in his attsmpt to reconcile Caesar and Pompey
I
before the Civil War.
The desire for peace was closely connected with I&8 doc-
trine of expediency in public affairs. There were occasions when
he was willing to purchase peace at the expense of principle,
yielding to the necessity of the times. Such an instance, which he
considered perfectly justifiable, was his approval of the knights 1
demands in Asia. Failure to oppose the triumvirate in 59 3. C. is
accounted for on the grounds of expediency, since he thought they
would work out their own destruction, if undisturbed. Support of
the triumvirs after returning from exile, and lastly his relations
with Caesar after Pharsalia, came about partly as a result of this
doctrine. He constantly impressed upon his friends the necessity
of a changing policy, in which he set the example, writing of the
approval he had given to the decree authorizing Caesar's acts, Hay
44 3. C, he says Fecimus id quidem teraporibus cedentes, quae valent
in re publica plurimum (F. IS. 1.2).
3 » Cicero was no political spoilsman.
Another prominent feature of his public life was his ab-
stention from the spoils of office, and his freedom from material
aims. This is proved most conclusively in the record of adminis-
tration in Cilicia, where he not only refused to plunder the citi-
zens, but even left part of the allowance granted to carry on the
government. Wealth was never the object of his ambition, and he was
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engaged in no great enterprises that required fortunes like those
squandered "by Caesar. It is evident that he received considerable
sums as legacies from time to time, probably as a result of pro-
fessional activities. Due credit must therefore be given him for
an exceptionally clear record, in a day when corruption and bribery
were rampant
.
4« Cicero 1 s career consistently that of a constitutionalist
.
In politics, Cicero was a constitutionalist throughout
his career. He early became an adherent of the optimates as repre-
senting that party, and formulated his political creed, with the
defense of the constitution in view. The year 63 B. C. stands out
as the period of his first great success along this line. The prin-
cipal object in attempting to gain Pompey, after the latter' s re-
turn from Asia, was thereby to strengthen the senatorial position.
It may be asserted that the Clodian affair and the exile severed
his connection with the optimates, but a more accurate examination
of the facts, proves that it was only interrupted. Their ill-will
and indifference drew him from the nobles into Caesar's party, a
temporary relation only. The fact that he was willing to join the
Pompeians after their treatment of him, and support them so loyally,
goes far to prove the strength of his allegiance (A. 8.16.2). Ut
bos armenta sic ego bonos viros aut eos, quicumque dicentur boni,
sequor, etiamsi ruent (A. 7.7.7). During the last two years of
his life, he offered the final proof of his sympathy for the con-
stitutional cause, all the more unmistakable because he defended
it at the expense of his leisure, his authorship, and, finally, his
life.
It is interesting to view Cicero's relations to Pompey,
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Caesar and Qctavian, in the light of his connection with the opti-
mates. His fidelity to Pompey is quite explicable on this ground,
while it is puzzling on any other. In 61 3. C. he looked upon
Pompey as the chief supporter of the state, clinging to him des-
perately until he joined the triumvirate. In spite of Pompey 1 s
union with Caesar, Cicero was willing in 49 B. C, to believe in
him once more, and regard him as the bulwark of the republic.
Caesar himself
,
for a brief period, awakened in Cicero the vain
hope that even he might be about to restore the former state, and
Cicero", as an optimate, gave his approval. Lastly, Oct avian in-
spired his loyalty, as long as he supposed his motives were patri-
otic, and that he had come "to establish and not to overthrow" the
republic
.
5» Cicero 1 s ideal was the republic of earlier days .
when Cicero referred to the republic, which was so sig-
nificant to him, he looked back to old conditions that had prevail-
ed in the time of Scipio. He himself would like to have played the
part of Laelius to Pompey's Scipio, as he expresses it (F. 5.7.3).
In this connection it will be recalled how many of the persons
figuring in Cicero's dialogues belong to this period. It was an
ideal which he was anxious to impress upon the younger generation,
a desire to which a letter to Curio testifies. Tu tamen, sive
habes aliquam spem de re publica sive desperas, ea para, meditare,
cogita, quae esse in eo civi ac viro debent, qui sit rem publican
adflictam et oppressam miseris temporibus ac perditis moribus in
veterem dignitatem et libertatem vindicaturus (F. 2.5.2). At the
best, however, he looked to the past and not the future. His
hopes were for the restoration of conditions that had disappeared,
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and not for some glorious new c ommonwo alt h of the future. This was
the reason for his failure to understand Caesar, and for the "gulf
which separated , the man whose eyes were ever on the past from the
(50)
man who stood at the helm and looked far into unknown seas."
6. Final est imate of Cicero as a public man .
Such are the political sympathies which the letters re-
veal, agreeing by no means with the extreme estimates of favorable
or unfavorable critics. They afford a point of view which resem-
bles that of the writers who maintain a moderate position, combin-
ing praise and blame. An effort has been made to present the evi-
dence without prejudice, looking rather to the larger estimate and
not over -emphasizing individual incidents. The result has been
that Cicero has appeared a man of peace, too much given to exped-
iency but free from political corruption, a devoted adherent of
the optimate party, a leader whose ideals, looking rather to the
past than to the future, obscured his vision of the Home that was
to be. In the light of the correspondence, Kepos' criticism has
been proved false, but for it, there may be substituted the more
accurate estimate of Augustus, borne • out b/ every page of the
letters. "My child," said Octavian to his grandson, many years
after Cicero's death, "this was a man of great intellect and a
lover of his country" (Plut. Cic. 49).
30 Fowler. Life of Caesar, p. 362
cf. Keitland vol. III. p. 260.
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